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The Credit Crisis as a Problem in the Sociology of 
Knowledge1 
Donald MacKenzie 
University of Edinburgh 
 
Abstract  This article analyzes the role played in the credit crisis of the 
processes by which different groups of market participants produce knowledge 
about financial instruments.  Employing documentary sources and a set of 87 
predominantly oral-history interviews, the article presents a historical sociology 
of the clusters of evaluation practices surrounding ABSs (asset-backed 
securities, most importantly mortgage-backed securities) and CDOs 
(collateralized debt obligations).  Despite the close structural similarity between 
ABSs and CDOs, these practices came to differ substantially, and became the 
province (e.g. in the rating agencies) of organizationally separate groups.  In 
consequence, when ABS CDOs (CDOs in which the underlying assets are 
ABSs) emerged, they were evaluated in two separate stages.  This created a 
fatally attractive arbitrage opportunity, large-scale exploitation of which 
sidelined a previously important set of gatekeepers (risk-sensitive investors in 
                                                
1 I am extremely grateful to my interviewees, without whose generosity with their time and insights 
this article could not have been written.  Several also provided helpful comments on early drafts, as did  
Patrick Aspers, David Bloor, Michel Callon, Neil Fligstein, Iain Hardie, Gavin Kretschmar, Horacio 
Ortiz, Martha Poon, Arthur Stinchcombe, and five anonymous AJS referees.  As always, however, 
responsibility for errors remains mine alone.  The research reported here was supported primarily by a 
grant (RES-062-23-1958) from the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), although  
funding for earlier relevant fieldwork also came from another ESRC grant (RES-051-27-0062), from 
the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EP/E001297/1), and from the Strategic 
Research Support Fund of the University of Edinburgh’s School of Social and Political Science.   
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the lower tranches of mortgage-backed securities) and eventually magnified and 
concentrated the banking system’s calamitous mortgage-related losses. 
 
Introduction 
At the heart of the credit crisis that erupted in summer 2007 and culminated in 
the near-collapse of the global banking system in the fall of 2008 were complex, 
esoteric financial instruments.  At the peak of the crisis, in October 2008, the IMF 
categorized the estimated $1.4 trillion losses that, were it not for massive international 
government intervention, would most likely have caused an economic catastrophe on 
the scale of the Great Depression.  More than half the total, $770 billion, was in 
mortgage-backed securities and asset-backed securities (ABSs) of other kinds, and 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).2  The largest single category of loss, $290 
billion, was in a class of instruments of which many outside the financial sector had 
simply been unaware prior to the crisis:  ABS CDOs, in other words collateralized 
debt obligations whose underlying assets are tranches of asset-backed securities, most 
commonly mortgage-backed securities (IMF 2008, table 1.1, p. 9). 
 
 Not only were the sums lost on ABS CDOs very large, but (as discussed in 
this article’s fifth section) the losses were concentrated at the very core of the global 
financial system.  ABS CDOs also had wider effects.  The “assembly lines” via which 
they were constructed reshaped the underlying market for mortgage-backed securities 
in ways that facilitated ever-looser mortgage underwriting.  Those losses and these 
                                                
2 ABSs and CDOs will be explained in more detail in the second and third sections of this article.  For 
now, it is adequate to think of them as sets of claims on the cash flow from a pool of underlying assets 
such as mortgages (in the case of ABSs) or corporate debt (in “corporate” CDOs.) 
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processes were by no means the only causes of the credit crisis, but to understand it 
fully we need to understand ABS CDOs, to grasp how they emerged from the world 
of mortgage-backed securities and the (cognitively quite different and 
organizationally largely separate) world of CDOs, and above all develop a 
sociological analysis of how these complex financial instruments were evaluated by 
market participants.  For example, differences between how market participants 
evaluated ABSs and evaluated CDOs, and the location of those evaluations in 
different groups or departments of credit rating agencies and banks, had a double 
effect.  In a situation in which investment behavior was largely governed by credit 
ratings, they made the construction of ABS CDOs highly profitable.  Simultaneously, 
however, they left the ABS CDO a kind of epistemic orphan, cognitively peripheral to 
both its parent worlds, ABSs and corporate CDOs. 
 
In its emphasis on evaluation,3 this article contributes to a growing body of 
work in economic sociology that shows the importance and richness of what Beckert 
(2009,  pp. 253-54) calls “the value problem,” in other words “the processes of 
classification and commensuration with which actors assign value to goods.”  As 
Carruthers and Stinchcombe (1999, p. 353) point out, “buyers and sellers” need “to 
know the commodities they transact in,” and the ease with which those commodities 
are bought and sold is, therefore, “among other things, an issue in the sociology of 
knowledge.” 
  
                                                
3 I write “evaluation,” not “valuation,” because I want to encompass practices such as credit rating that 
contribute to knowledge of economic value but do not themselves generate a monetary valuation. 
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Carruthers and Stinchcombe focus on a particular set of knowledge-generating 
arrangements, to be found for example in the trading of the shares of large corporations, 
that one might call the “canonical mechanism.”  It involves the standardization of the 
financial claims or other commodities being traded, continuous auctions coordinated 
either by an exchange or by dealers who act as “market makers,” and wide dissemination 
of the resultant prices.4  These arrangements are, as Carruthers and Stinchcombe show, 
powerful generators of public knowledge, but they are also limited in their scope, even in 
their primary domain, the financial markets. The ABS and CDO tranches discussed here 
were not, in general, traded in canonical-mechanism markets.  They were usually bought 
directly from those who had constructed them, who frequently were dealers based at 
major international banks, and in many cases then simply retained by the purchasers.  
Secondary trading of them was on a limited scale, and was always “over-the-counter” 
(conducted by direct institution-to-institution negotiation) rather than on an organized 
exchange.  Even in the limited cases in which some of these instruments were made 
sufficiently standard that canonical-mechanism trading was possible, there was an 
undercurrent of dissent, touched on in the penultimate section below, about whether the 
publicly-quoted prices of them were fully reliable and legitimate. 
 
 In consequence, this is a case in which the analysis of the “social processes 
behind the constitution of value” (Beckert 2009, p. 254) needs to look beyond the 
canonical mechanism.  There is a substantial body of work by economic sociologists 
                                                
4 On market-making, see Abolafia (1996); on the way auctions can produce legitimacy and shared 
knowledge of value, see Smith (1989); on the varying “quality” of prices, see Muniesa (2007).  The 
“efficient market hypothesis” of financial economics (Fama 1970) is, in effect, the hypothesis that the 
price of a financial instrument in a canonical-mechanism market is the best guide to its value. 
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on these processes, mainly concerning contexts outside the financial markets and 
often – though not always – goods and services that are “singular” (Karpik 2010): not 
straightforwardly commensurable.  The situations on which this literature has focused 
include: those in which the legitimacy of a product or of monetary valuation is 
contested (see, e.g., Zelizer 1979 on life insurance and Zelizer 1994 on children); 
where incommensurable forms of evaluation or “orders of worth” contend (Boltanski 
and Thévenot 2006, Stark 2009); perceptions of value interact with aesthetic 
judgments (e.g., Velthuis 2005 and Aspers 2005); the quality of a product is inferred 
from the status of its producer (e.g., Podolny 1993, 2005; see Aspers 2009); or the 
value of a commodity to one buyer depends directly on anticipation of its value to 
other buyers (as in the case of dot.com stocks or houses bought in the anticipation of 
selling them to others at a higher price).5 
 
ABSs and CDOs are not valued for their aesthetic properties, and the moral 
legitimacy of monetary valuation of them has never been challenged.  With those 
exceptions, however, all the phenomena listed in the previous paragraph can be found 
in respect to ABS and CDOs, and I return to two of them in the conclusion. However, 
the main way in which the evaluation of ABSs, CDOs, and ABS CDOs contributed to 
the crisis concerns the apparently “technical” core of evaluation.  ABSs, CDOs, and 
                                                
5 This last situation, famously formulated by Keynes (1936, p. 156), is amongst those emphasized by 
the “economics of convention”: see Eymard-Duvernay, Favereau, Orléan, Salais, and Thévenot (2005), 
and more generally Eymard-Duvernay (1989) and Favereau and Lazega (2002).  Clearly the process is 
an important contributor to bubbles in both the stockmarket and housing market.  It is, however, not at 
the center of my analysis because the instruments discussed were usually held for the “spread” they 
offered (see below), rather than purchased primarily because it was anticipated that they could be 
resold at a higher price. 
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ABS CDOs are debt instruments.  They normally entitle investors (a) to defined 
“coupons” (interest payments), set either as a fixed percentage or as a fixed margin or 
“spread” over a benchmark interest rate such as Libor (London Interbank Offered 
Rate), and (b) to eventual repayment of principal (their initial capital investment).  
The monetary worth of an investment in an ABS or CDO is thus the aggregate present 
value of those future payments.  If the payments were entirely certain, the valuation of 
an ABS or CDO would be a matter simply of arithmetic, but they are not. There are 
two main risks: default (in other words that the payments are not made, or not made in 
full) and prepayment (i.e. principal is repaid earlier than anticipated, in a situation in 
which it can be reinvested only at a lower rate of interest). This article’s focus is on 
whether and how those risks were taken into account in the evaluation of ABSs, 
CDOs, and ABS CDOs. 
 
How might “technical” processes of evaluation of this kind be analyzed 
sociologically?  This article draws its inspiration from studies of scientific practice. 
Historians and sociologists have found that practice to be far less uniform than 
traditional notions of a unitary “scientific method” might suggest (see, for example, 
Galison and Stamp 1996), and have sought to capture distinctive clusters of practice 
in notions such as the “local scientific cultures” of Barnes, Bloor, and Henry (1996), 
the “subcultures” and “competing traditions” of Galison (1997), the “experimental 
cultures” of Rheinberger (1997), “epistemic cultures” of Knorr Cetina (1999), 
“epistemological cultures” of Fox Keller (2002), and “evidential cultures” of Collins 
(2004).   
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 Can similar patterned differences in evaluation practices be found in financial 
markets?6   This article suggests that they can,7 using as its main evidence differences 
between the evaluation of ABSs and of CDOs, which are structurally very similar 
instruments (indeed sometimes simply lumped together, as for example by McDonald 
and Robinson 2009).  In evaluation, as in scientific practices, one can find “aggregate 
patterns and dynamics that are on display in expert practice and that vary in different 
settings of expertise … patterns on which various actions converge and which they 
instantiate and dynamically extend” (Knorr Cetina 1999, pp. 8-9).  Let me call these 
patterns “clusters of evaluation practices.”  (Following the literature on science and 
calling them “evaluation cultures” might be taken to imply greater homogeneity and 
“bounded-offness” of their practitioners than is the case.8  It could also be taken 
wrongly as implying a theory of action as based solely on “belief” and “habit” – for 
which see Camic 1986 – rather than self-interested, reflexive rational choice.  As 
                                                
6 For an analysis of differences amongst evaluation practices in a different sphere, see Fourcade (2009). 
7 Although the article focuses on evaluation practices relevant to the credit crisis, other sociological 
work on financial markets also suggests the existence of distinct clusters of practice.  See, especially, 
the characterization of different approaches to assessing the value of stocks in Smith (1999). 
8 The literature on science also employs a broader understanding of the “symbolic” than is sometimes 
found when “culture” is invoked in the wider social sciences. As Knorr-Cetina (1999, p. 11) puts it, 
“symbolic structurings … come into view through the definition of entities, through systems of 
classification, through the ways in which epistemic strategy, empirical procedure, and social 
collaboration are understood in the … fields investigated.”  It should be noted, however, that 
symbolism in the ordinary sense is not entirely absent from the evaluation practices discussed here. In 
particular, AAA was a rating that had a real symbolic cachet, frequently being understood to mean 
effectively free of any risk of default. 
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discussed in the conclusion, belief and habit were present, but by no means 
exclusively so.)9 
 
 The research on which this article is based, which is outlined at the end of this 
introduction, supports six postulates about these clusters.10  First, clusters of 
evaluation practices are the path-dependent outcomes of historical contingencies.11  
For example, while the evaluation practices surrounding CDOs always had default 
risk as their primary object, those surrounding mortgage-backed securities were 
concerned primarily with prepayment.  As the following section will show, that latter 
focus originally arose because of features of the political economy of mortgage 
lending in the US that can be traced back to the 1930s.  The focus on prepayment 
remained in place even in the very different circumstances of the past decade: it 
formed a criterion on which that decade’s subprime mortgage-backed securities were 
judged superior to their prime counterparts. In emphasizing long-lasting effects such 
as this, I do not want to suggest that evaluation practices never change.  They do – 
change in them is a major focus of this article – but the way in which they change is 
path-dependent: it is easier, for example, to modify an existing practice than to 
develop an entirely new one. 
                                                
9 Conceiving of clusters of evaluation practices as “communities of practice” (Lave and Wenger 1991) 
would involve a similar risk: the term might be taken to imply higher levels of interaction amongst 
practitioners than often was the case, especially in what appear to have been the rather fragmented 
practices surrounding ABSs. 
10 While these postulates are presented here simply as summarizing the findings of this research, some 
(notably 1 and 6) are also hypotheses that could be explored elsewhere.  For reasons of space, I 
concentrate in this article on the evidence for the first, second, third, and sixth postulates. 
11 On path-dependency more generally, see, e.g., Arthur (1984), David (1992), and Nunn (2009). 
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 Second, the more elaborate of evaluation practices give rise to, and are 
informed by, distinctive ontologies: distinctive presuppositions about the nature and 
properties of the features and processes of the economic world.  Thus the third section 
of the article will show that the evaluation practices surrounding CDOs came to be 
oriented heavily to one such feature, “credit correlation” (a term that will be explained 
in that section), which was a notion entirely absent, at least in any explicit form, in the 
evaluation of ABSs.  Like many scientific objects, correlation was neither simply 
“real” nor simply “fictional” (Knorr Cetina 1999, pp. 248-52).  It was not observable 
in any straightforward sense: to invoke it was to invoke the unseen.  Yet, like the 
scientific objects analyzed by Daston (2000), it had the potential to become “more 
real,” as specific markets (the tradable credit indices described below) were created in 
which its effects were more easily traced.  Indeed, some of those involved with CDOs 
came to hold that in those markets correlation was not just real but tradable.  For 
others, though, the frustrating difficulties of measuring correlation indicated it was a 
misconception, an artifact of inadequate models. 
 
 Third, evaluation practices become organizational routines, and when 
different practices are pursued in the same organization, they frequently are the 
province of separate parts of it.12  For instance, the evaluation of ABSs on the one 
hand and CDOs on the other typically became the responsibility of different sections 
of banks, of the specialist “monoline” insurers, and of credit rating agencies.  In the 
case of the rating agencies, for example, both ABSs and CDOs fell within the remit of 
                                                
12 See also Beunza and Stark (2004), who demonstrate the spatial distribution of different evaluation 
practices across the different “desks” (subgroups) of the trading room they study. 
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their structured finance departments, but the latter had separate groups dealing with 
each.  When ABS CDOs (which are CDOs with ABSs nested within them, so to 
speak) came into being, the decision as to how to evaluate them was thus also a 
decision about how their evaluation should be mapped onto the organizational 
structure of rating agencies.  All the three main agencies – Moody’s, Standard & 
Poor’s (S&P), and Fitch – found the same solution: they relied on the existing ratings, 
by ABS groups, of the component ABSs, and assigned the analysis of the higher-level 
structure to their CDO groups.  Those groups analyzed that structure largely as if it 
was simply another variant of a CDO, for which their existing practices were 
therefore appropriate, rather than treating an ABS CDO as a radically different 
instrument that demanded new evaluation techniques. 
 
Fourth, in modern debt markets (in which I include the markets for bonds, 
tradable loans, and structured instruments such as ABSs and CDOs) evaluation 
practices regulate actions and become means of governance via the process of credit 
rating.13  Ratings (see figure 1) encode rating agencies’ conclusions about either the 
likelihood of default on debt instruments (in the case of S&P and Fitch) or, in the case 
of Moody’s, the expected loss on them (the likelihood of loss multiplied by its 
severity).  For institutional investors such as banks, insurance companies, and pension 
funds (private individuals were never major participants in the ABS and CDO 
markets discussed here), ratings frequently become rules.  Cantor, ap Gwilym, and 
Thomas (2007, p. 14) note that in the US “there are currently over 100 federal laws 
and 50 regulations incorporating credit ratings,” and they report that the purchases of 
                                                
13 For all their importance, the credit rating agencies have been the object of surprisingly little social-
science attention.  The single best study of them is Sinclair (2005). 
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74 percent of their sample of US investment fund managers (and 78 percent of 
European managers) were subject to a minimum-rating requirement: if an 
instrument’s rating was below the minimum, they were not allowed to buy it.  
Especially towards the end of the period discussed here, banking regulation in 
particular relied heavily on ratings, with banks able to hold much smaller capital 
reserves in respect to instruments with high ratings, a factor that greatly enhanced the 
attractiveness of the most senior tranches of the instruments discussed here. 
 
- FIGURE ONE AROUND HERE - 
 
Fifth, evaluation practices crystallized in ratings reduce a difficult problem of 
evaluation (assessing complex, novel financial instruments that involve potentially 
uncertain payments stretching years into the future) to a simple one, by establishing a 
rough equivalence amongst debt instruments of different kinds and with different 
particularities.  Though some buyers of ABSs and CDOs had a good understanding 
of the detail of evaluation practices (such as the Gaussian copula models discussed 
below), many did not, and the market for these instruments would have been quite 
limited if participation in the market required that understanding.  Ratings “black 
boxed” these complexities.  They permitted the economic value of different ABSs and 
CDOs to be compared, both with each other and with more familiar, less complex 
instruments such as corporate bonds, by comparing the “spread” (increment over 
Libor or other benchmark interest rate) offered by a given instrument to that offered 
by others with the same rating.  In consequence, as one dealer put it, “You knew that 
if you hit a certain spread for a given rating, that the deal was sold” (quoted in 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 2008, p. 22).  This spreads-
 12 
ratings nexus was thus a convention in the sense of the French “economics of 
convention”: a way of turning what might otherwise be radical uncertainty into a form 
of order that – while never unchanging – is stable and predictable enough to permit 
coordination and rational action, thus solving the wider problem of social order in 
markets on which Beckert (2009) and others (e.g. White 1981 and 2002) focus.  A 
bank producing a novel instrument could anticipate the most important metric (spread 
for a given rating) by which it would be judged, and – by discovering the spreads 
offered by the instruments with the same rating that others had recently sold14 – could 
know the combinations of ratings and spreads that were needed for the instrument to 
be “competitive.”  The detailed design of both ABSs and CDOs was always informed 
by how they would be evaluated by the rating agencies, in a clear manifestation of 
what Espeland and Sauder (2007) call “reactivity”: the effects of evaluation or 
ranking on what is being evaluated and ranked.  
  
Sixth, when they bear upon the same instrument, or same risk, evaluation 
practices that differ permit a specific form of profit-making: arbitrage.15  At least 
some of the time, different practices will lead to the same instrument or same risk 
being valued differently. In consequence, it may be possible to sell the instrument or 
risk to one market participant while buying it more cheaply from another, with the 
difference in prices being riskless profit – in other words, arbitrage profit.  Many 
CDOs and nearly all ABS CDOs were constructed in order to perform arbitrage, and 
this also became increasingly the motivation for constructing ABSs.  The evaluation 
                                                
14 These spreads were never fully public knowledge, but knowledge of them circulated reasonably 
widely amongst both constructors of ABSs and CDOs and regular buyers of them. 
15 For sociological discussion of arbitrage, see e.g. Beunza and Stark (2004). 
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practices employed by the rating agencies had the consequence that assets that had 
high spreads and that were only modestly creditworthy could be packaged into 
instruments with high ratings, which could therefore be sold to investors at lower 
spreads, with the constructor of the instrument capturing most of the difference as 
arbitrage profit.  As an interviewee put it in June 2006: 
the whole [CDO] market is rating-agency-driven at some level ... the 
game is basically to create ... tranches of portfolios which are A, AA, or 
AAA-rated and yield significantly more than a correspondingly-rated 
tranche of a corporate or an asset-backed derivative, commercial 
mortgage-backed security would yield ... it’s just that there are investors 
who are constrained by ratings ... and that creates value for everyone 
else and we’re in the business of exploiting that. 
 
 Hence, in brief summary, the connection between the evaluation practices 
surrounding ABSs and CDOs and the credit crisis.  Ratings-governed investors, the 
ratings-spreads nexus, differences in evaluation practices, and the way those practices 
mapped on to the organizational structures of rating agencies created arbitrage 
opportunities that persisted.  One such opportunity was created by the separate 
evaluation of ABSs and CDOs, following different practices and (in the rating 
agencies) by different groups. ABS CDOs were created primarily to exploit that 
arbitrage, and the huge scale on which this was done was amongst the causes of the 
crisis.  By changing the composition of the underlying market for ABSs, ABS CDOs 
removed previously influential gatekeepers (the traditional buyers of the lower 
tranches of ABSs: see Adelson and Jacob 2008a), and in so doing very likely helped 
clear the way for increasingly reckless mortgage lending.  ABS CDOs also magnified 
 14 
the resultant mortgage-related losses in the way discussed in the article’s fifth section, 
and a specific aspect of them – their large, apparently ultra-safe, but low-spread 
“super-senior” tranches – fatally concentrated those losses at the heart of the global 
banking system. 
 
 In showing, in this way, the role of the clusters of evaluation practices 
surrounding ABSs and CDOs in the genesis of the credit crisis, this article is intended 
to complement, not contradict, existing explanations, both those that focus on 
macroeconomic factors16 and those offered by the emerging sociological literature on 
the crisis (to which the single most important contribution is the collection edited by 
Lounsbury and Hirsch 2010).  Closest in this latter literature to this article are the 
analyses of mortgage securitization and the role of credit rating agencies in Carruthers 
(2010), Fligstein and Goldstein (2010), Pozner, Stimmler, and Hirsch (2010), and 
Rona-Tas and Hiss (2010), along with the discussion of credit default swaps in 
Morgan (2010).17  I share, for example, Fligstein and Goldstein’s emphasis in the role 
played by government in modern US mortgage securitization and their sense – also to 
be found in other sociological contributions such as Guillén and Suárez (2010) and 
Schneiberg and Bartley (2010) – that an entirely rational-choice, agency-theoretic 
                                                
16 These factors include global economic imbalances – notably the “savings glut” in countries such as 
China with big trade surpluses – and an extended period of low interest rates, which prompted a 
“search for yield”: widespread hunger for even fractionally higher interest rates (see, e.g., Turner 
2009). 
17 Also relevant, though they do not discuss the crisis, are the sociological discussion of the 
development of credit derivatives in Huault and Rainelli-Le Montagner (2009) and the excellent 
ethnography of ABS purchases and ABS CDO construction at a French fund management company in 
Ortiz (2008). 
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explanation of the crisis is unsatisfactory. What this article adds to this existing work 
is (a) extensive primary-source analysis of the practices of credit rating and other 
forms of evaluation; (b) an interpretation of the consequences of those evaluation 
practices that focuses not on fees-driven rating-agency wrongdoing and other forms of 
“amoral calculation” (Vaughan 1996) but on the content of those practices, on their 
mapping onto the organizational structures of the agencies, and on the arbitrage 
opportunity to which it gave rise;18 and (c) a focus, almost entirely missing in the 
existing sociological literature, on ABS CDOs, on the change they brought about in 
the structure of the ABS market, on the way in which they magnified and 
concentrated losses on ABSs, and on the crucial interaction between them and credit 
default swaps. 
 
There are few reliable secondary sources on the history of ABSs and CDOs to 
draw on: the best are the insightful, archivally-based, analysis of the modern origins 
of US mortgage-backed securities in Quinn (2009); Tett’s (2009a) lively, interview-
based account of the J.P. Morgan credit-derivatives group; and two other interview-
based books (Zuckerman 2009 and Lewis 2010) focused mainly on those who 
successfully bet against mortgage-backed securities. The research reported here has 
thus involved the construction of a historical narrative largely afresh, drawing on two 
main sets of primary sources.  The first is 87 interviews, mainly in London and New 
York, with 77 market participants,19 including 36 who are or were constructors, 
                                                
18 Empirically determining the relative weight of amoral calculation versus other 
cognitive/organizational factors is very difficult.  I return to this issue in the conclusion. 
19 Six interviews were with two market participants, and two involved three interviewees.  Three 
participants were interviewed three times, and 14 were interviewed twice. 
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managers, brokers, or traders of the financial instruments discussed in this article; 14 
who are “quants” (specialists in quantitative modeling); 16 who are or have been 
rating-agency employees; and four who are or were market regulators.20  The 
interviews took place in two phases, before and after the onset of the credit crisis in 
the early summer of 2007.  The earlier phase, which consisted of 29 interviews, was a 
pilot study focusing on what I describe below as “corporate CDOs.”  The 58 more 
recent interviews cover the full range of instruments discussed here. 
 
 The interviews took a loosely oral history form, in which interviewees were led 
through those parts of their careers in which they had been involved with the financial 
instruments examined here.  Questioning was semi-structured, and was designed to 
elucidate the evolution of the relevant market and the main innovations and forms of 
evaluation in it (sometimes specific issues were dealt with by follow-up email questions 
or repeat interviews).  No claim of statistical representativeness can be made: there is no 
list of individuals involved in the ABS or CDO markets that can be sampled, so the 
sample was constructed by “snowballing” from an initial set of interviewees identified 
via documentary sources.   
 
Oral-history interviewing has notorious pitfalls: interviewees may have fallible 
memories, and may wish to promulgate particular views of episodes in which they were 
involved, especially in the aftermath of a disaster such as the credit crisis.  The sensitivity 
of the topic adds other difficulties.  Several banks, for example, now insist that all 
                                                
20 The remaining interviewees were two who provide hardware on which computationally intensive 
models are run, four who work for firms specializing in provision of price data, and an accountant with 
specialist knowledge of accounting for financial instruments. 
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contacts with the press (a category that currently includes research of this kind) must be 
through their communications department, often rendering direct interview access 
impossible.  (Many banks face multiple lawsuits, and their fear may be that interviewing 
might produce information helpful to hostile litigants.)  Occasionally, interviews had to 
be conducted in the presence of public relations staff.  At other times, perhaps to avoid 
this kind of problem, interviewees would ask me to ring them from my mobile telephone 
from outside their building or in its lobby.  They would then leave the building and I 
would interview them in a cafe or restaurant.  The need for anonymity is therefore even 
greater than normal. In order to ensure it, I sometimes use phrases such as “a rating 
agency” or “a bank,” rather than naming the organization in question. 
 
 These drawbacks and difficulties of interviewing rendered a second source of 
primary data, contemporaneous documents, equally valuable, both in its own right and as 
a means of triangulation.  These documents included the specialist trade press, such as 
Credit and Creditflux (and, for more recent years in which the ABS and CDO markets 
have become much more prominent, also the Financial Times and Wall Street Journal), 
and the technical literature on the evaluation of ABSs and CDOs, including textbooks, 
manuals, and the technical reports in which the credit rating agencies described the 
procedures and models used to rate these instruments.  Of course, such documents also 
have their limitations as historical evidence (textbooks, for example, portray idealized 
versions of evaluation practices), but they are useful nonetheless.  For example, Fabozzi, 
Bhattacharya, and Berliner’s 2007 textbook or Adelson’s informal “trip reports” after 
ABS conferences (e.g., Adelson 2006d) are now windows into a lost world, mortgage-
backed securities before the disaster that became apparent only a few months after they 
were written. 
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 Because of the need to reconstruct an often-intricate historical process in which 
apparently small choices had large, lasting consequences, this article is inevitably 
lengthy.  It has six sections.  After this introduction comes a section on the historical 
shaping of the evaluation practices surrounding securitizations of pools of residential 
mortgages.  The third section deals with the original “corporate” CDOs, in which the 
underlying assets were bonds issued by corporations or loans made to them.   The section 
shows that although they too emerged from the world of securitization, the evaluation 
practices of the world of “credit derivatives” that they came to inhabit differed radically.  
The fourth section deals with the somewhat later ABS CDOs (CDOs in which the 
underlying assets were ABSs, mainly mortgage-backed securities, not corporate debt), 
and shows how an alluring arbitrage opportunity was created by the way in which they 
were evaluated, particularly by how this evaluation was mapped onto the organizational 
structures of the rating agencies.  The fifth section examines the contribution of ABS 
CDOs to the crisis.  It discusses how ABS CDOs changed the ABS market and (via their 
super-senior tranches) concentrated the resultant losses, and how default swaps both 
magnified the crisis and – via a new canonical-mechanism market, the ABX – rendered it 
visible.  The sixth section is the article’s conclusion. 
 
Mortgage-Backed Securities and the Emphasis on Prepayment Risk 
Mortgage lending in the US was shaped for decades by government responses to the 
effects of the Great Depression on the housing market. The form of mortgage prevalent 
prior to the 1930s – a five-to-ten year variable-interest loan, which did not fully amortize, 
leaving borrowers needing to make large repayments of principal at its maturity – greatly 
exacerbated the Depression’s effects, and at its peak “nearly 10 percent of homes were in 
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foreclosure” (Green and Wachter 2005, pp. 94-95).  In response, the Roosevelt 
administration created three organizations that radically changed mortgage lending.  The 
Home Owner’s Loan Corporation used funds raised from bond sales to buy mortgages 
which borrowers could not repay, and replaced them with new long-term (twenty-year 
maturity) fixed rate loans that amortized in full.  The Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA) insured mortgages of this new form against default (in return for insurance 
premiums paid by the borrower), thus helping to restart large-scale private mortgage 
lending.  The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), set up in 1938, tried 
to foster a secondary market in mortgages insured by the FHA, though in practice it itself 
and the Federal Home Loan Banks were the main purchasers (Snowden 1995, p. 262). 
 
 Deliberate government action thus brought about the dominance of what Green 
and Wachter (2005) call simply “the American mortgage”: its interest rate was fixed, 
typically at around 5 to 6 percent, even over the long-term (in 1948, the FHA started to 
insure thirty-year mortgages), thus protecting borrowers from interest-rate rises; and 
borrowers had the right to prepay (redeem) mortgages at any point, with no penalty.  
“The American mortgage” helped change the US “from a nation of urban renters to 
suburban homeowners” (Green and Wachter 2005, p. 97).  However, it always had 
drawbacks – it was, for example, often not available to ethnic minorities (see Stuart 2003) 
– and providing it became ever more difficult in the 1960s, as the low-interest savings 
accounts that traditionally had funded it were drained by the growing availability of 
higher rates elsewhere.   
 
With renewed direct government borrowing to fund mortgage lending rendered 
unattractive by the Johnson Administration’s growing budgetary problems (Quinn 2009), 
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a solution was found in selling to private investors government-backed securities based 
on pools of mortgages.  Fannie Mae was partly privatized. Its remaining Federal sections, 
renamed the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), gave a 
government guarantee to securities backed by pools of mortgages, starting with Ginnie 
Mae Pool No. 1, issued in February 1970.  In 1971, the newly-created Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) started to sell securities based on pools of 
mortgages it had itself purchased; Fannie Mae began to do so in 1981.  By 1991, Ginnie 
Mae had guaranteed, and Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae had issued, a total of just over a 
trillion dollars of mortgage-backed securities (Carron 1990; Fabozzi and Modigliani 
1992, pp. 18-24; Carruthers and Stinchcombe 1999; Tower 1999). 
 
 That securitization (the packaging of income-generating assets into pools and the 
sale of securities that are claims on that income) began its modern history21 in the US as a 
government program, and that what were securitized were “American mortgages” – 
fixed-interest loans with no prepayment penalties – had lasting effects on how mortgage-
backed securities were evaluated.  The three government-sponsored enterprises – Ginnie 
Mae, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac – set quality criteria for the mortgages they would 
guarantee or buy, thus defining “conforming” or “prime” mortgages.  They guaranteed 
investors in mortgage-backed securities against defaults on the underlying mortgages, 
and the full credit of the US government was seen as backing the three enterprises, so 
investors could treat those securities as involving no risk of default.  (Only Ginnie Mae 
guarantees were legal obligations of the Federal government, but investors generally took 
the government implicitly to stand behind Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as well.) 
                                                
21 For earlier developments, in the US and elsewhere, see Snowden (1995), Bogue (1955), and 
Goetzmann and Newman (2010). 
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Prepayment, though, was a quite different matter.  Originally, the absence in “the 
American mortgage” of a prepayment penalty was of no great consequence, since the 
costs of refinancing were considerable – fees and loan points (up-front interest payments) 
could amount to 2 percent of the new loan (Ranieri 1996, p. 43) – creating a de facto 
penalty.  However, as competition reduced those costs, the option enjoyed by borrowers 
to refinance without penalty when interest rates fell became more valuable and much 
more frequently exercised.  As one interviewee put it to me, if you held a mortgage-
backed security yielding 5 ½ percent, and you noticed that new securities were offering 
only 4 ½ percent because interest rates had fallen, you could be certain that the mortgages 
underpinning the security you owned were “all going to prepay,” and you would 
therefore quickly stop enjoying the higher yield.  While most bonds rise in price when 
interest rates fall (because the fixed “coupons” they offer become relatively more 
valuable), this effect is therefore much attenuated for mortgage-backed securities: as this 
interviewee told me, their price seldom rises above 110 (i.e. 10 percent more than their 
“par” or face value).  
 
As Lewis Ranieri, Salomon Brothers’ famous trader of mortgage-backed 
securities, complained, the absence of a prepayment penalty meant that “the mortgage 
instrument becomes so perfect for the borrower that a large economic benefit is taken 
away from the other participants, including the long-term investor” (1996, p. 43).  What 
came into being, therefore, were evaluation practices amongst investors in mortgage-
backed securities that focused not on default but on prepayment risk.  (Indeed, the 
government-sponsored enterprises transformed defaults into prepayments: if a borrower 
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defaulted, the enterprises paid investors in the corresponding pool of mortgages the sum 
they would have received if the mortgage had been prepaid at that point.) 
 
Assessing the exact extent to which the prepayment option reduces the value of 
mortgage-backed securities is a notoriously difficult matter (neither interest-rate changes 
themselves nor their precise effects on prepayment rates are fully predictable) and 
assessing it was traditionally seen as the crucial skill in evaluating mortgage-backed 
securities.  Prepayment was, for example, the primary risk that Ranieri and the other 
Salomon Brothers’ traders of these securities described in Lewis’s Liar’s Poker (1990) 
were slicing, dicing, buying, and selling, and it was for their excellent grasp of 
prepayment risk that the Salomon Brothers’ modelers who helped form the famous hedge 
fund Long-Term Capital Management were known.  Prepayment “was a dominant issue,” 
an interviewee told me: “it drove everything in what people would think about.” 
 
Government-sponsored mortgage securitization had, however, been successful 
despite the prepayment problem, which made it an attractive model for banks and finance 
companies seeking new ways of funding their lending.  In 1977, the first modern “private 
label” (not government-sponsored) US mortgage-backed securities were issued by the 
Bank of America, in collaboration with Salomon – an event that prompted Ranieri to coin 
the term “securitization” (see Ranieri 1996, p. 31) – and from 1985 onwards banks also 
began securitizing auto loans, truck loans, equipment leases, and credit-card receivables 
(Rosenthal and Ocampo 1988, table B.1).  The generic term “ABS” (asset-backed 
security) came into use to describe the products of these and other securitizations.22   
                                                
22 Usage of the term “ABS” is not consistent through time.  Only once subprime mortgage 
securitizations became popular did it start to include mortgage-backed securities, and even then 
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These new private-label securitizations typically involved the parent bank or 
finance company setting up a special-purpose vehicle (such as a trust) that was legally 
separate from its parent, so that the creditors of the one had no claim on the assets of the 
other.  The vehicle then bought pools of loans from the bank, raising the money to do so 
by selling securities that were claims on the interest payments and principal repayments 
on those loans. Since those securities had no government backing, the risk of default on 
those loans could no longer be ignored entirely.  The early government-backed securities 
(known as “pass-through certificates”) offered identical, equal shares of the cash flow 
from the underlying mortgages, but increasingly what was created in private 
securitizations was not a single class of pass-through certificates, but two, three, or more 
classes or “tranches” of claims differentiated by credit risk, as in figure 2.  The lowest 
tranche – the “first-loss piece” – bore the first losses caused by default on the pool of 
mortgages or other assets underpinning the securitization.  In early deals, this tranche was 
typically retained by the bank or finance company that arranged the securitization; later, 
first-loss securities were sometimes sold by private arrangement to outside investors – 
often hedge funds – who received a large spread (increment over Libor or other 
benchmark interest rate) for taking on the risk of loss.   
 
- FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE -   
 
Only if defaults rose to such a level that losses entirely exhausted the lowest 
tranche were the investors in the next tranche, which came to be called “mezzanine,” at 
                                                                                                                                      
securitizations of prime mortgages were not generally referred to as ABSs.  In this article, however, the 
term “ABS” always includes mortgage securitizations. 
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risk.  In early securitizations this tranche was also often retained by the parent bank or 
finance company.  It would typically be bigger than the lowest tranche – perhaps as much 
as eight times as big (Rosenthal and Ocampo 1988, p. 10) – which meant that losses on it 
could in aggregate be large.  However, because the cushion provided by the lowest 
tranche made the probability of mezzanine losses modest, the bank arranging the 
securitization could buy insurance against them from the specialist insurers known as 
“monolines,” whose original business had been insuring US municipal bonds.  At the top 
of the hierarchy of tranches was the “senior” tranche, by far the largest, which was 
always sold to outside investors.  With both lower tranches as buffers, the risk of loss on 
it was seen as very low.  Accordingly, only relatively modest “spreads” were thought 
necessary to compensate for this small risk. 
 
The most prominent of the actors who had to concern themselves with default risk 
were the rating agencies, whose services had not been needed when securitization was a 
government program.  S&P began to rate securitizations in 1978 and Moody’s in 1983.23  
The evaluation practices they employed had three characteristics. First, they were heavily 
influenced by past episodes of large-scale mortgage defaults.  S&P, for example, used the 
default rates in the US during the Great Depression as the “stress scenario” for a AAA 
rating: if a tranche was to be rated AAA, the structure of the security had to protect the 
tranche from loss even if defaults again rose to Great Depression levels (interview data; 
Khadem and Parisi 2007, pp. 546-47).  Second, analysis was originally of pools of 
mortgages, not individual loans.  The rating agencies defined the characteristics (such as 
loan-to-value ratios) of a “benchmark” pool or set of pools, and then compared the 
characteristics of the actual pool of mortgages underlying a mortgage-backed security to 
                                                
23 See the data tables in Roy and McDermott (2007); q.v. Cantor and Packer (1994, p. 20). 
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the benchmark.  Deviations between the two were then translated into set “penalties” (or 
set “rewards”) in the rating processes.24 
 
Third, both the rating process and the construction of mortgage-backed securities 
and other ABSs hinged around the same parameter: the “credit enhancement” or “credit 
support” level needed for each tranche to achieve the rating that the constructors of the 
ABS desired.  (This level is the total size of the lower tranches, guarantees, reserve funds, 
etc., that protect a tranche from losses.  From the constructor’s viewpoint, all these 
mechanisms are expensive: e.g., if lower tranches are sold to outside investors, the higher 
spreads required to attract them limit the spread that can be offered on the senior tranche.)  
For instance, the “penalties” or “rewards” referred to in the previous paragraph took the 
form of the rating agencies demanding set increases or allowing set decreases in a 
security’s credit support levels to the extent that the pool of mortgages underpinning it 
was judged riskier or less risky than the benchmark pool.  The securities themselves and 
knowledge of the securities were thus co-produced: credit support levels, the crucial 
parameters in the design of a tranched security, were determined by the ratings agencies’ 
procedures for evaluating those securities. 
 
 From the mid-1990s onwards, evaluation techniques based on the analysis of 
pools were complemented by techniques that did involve estimating the default 
probabilities of individual mortgages, as least relative to the benchmark of prime lending.  
The rating agencies developed logistic regression or hazard rate models (S&P’s Levels, 
Moody’s Mortgage Metrics, and Fitch’s Resilogic), which incorporated characteristics 
both of the mortgage, such as loan-to-value ratio, and of the borrower, notably his or her 
                                                
24 See, especially, Bhattacharya and Cannon (1989), in particular their worked example (pp. 482-83). 
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FICO score, a measure of creditworthiness developed by Fair, Isaac & Company, 
originally for forms of consumer credit other than mortgages (see Poon 2007).  The 
parameters of these models were estimated using large datasets containing both this 
information and the payment histories of the resultant mortgages, such as those built up 
since 1991 by the San Francisco-based firm, Loan Performance.  The growing use of 
FICO scores and of models incorporating them both facilitated and was encouraged by 
increasing volumes of “subprime” lending to people whose impaired credit histories 
made them ineligible for prime mortgages (Poon 2009). 
 
 From the viewpoint of the quite different evaluation practices that eventually 
developed around CDOs (discussed in the next section), there remained a striking 
silence in the evaluation of mortgage-backed securities.  There was almost no explicit 
modeling of statistical dependence amongst mortgage defaults, in other words no 
modeling of what CDO specialists came to call “correlation.”25  Defaults were treated 
mathematically as statistically independent events, with “correlation” handled 
implicitly.  For instance, in the rating of mortgage-backed securities at Standard & 
Poor’s, correlation amongst defaults induced by macroeconomic variables such as the 
unemployment rate was handled by continuing to use stress scenarios, even after the 
regression or hazard-rate models were developed.  The latter were used not to 
estimate absolute default probabilities, but to determine the amounts by which the 
stress-scenario default rates of the benchmark prime pool should be modified for the 
particular pool being evaluated.  (If, for example, the Great-Depression-based AAA-
stress default rate of the benchmark pool was 10 percent, then the equivalent rate for a 
                                                
25 The rating agencies were not unique in this. Thus Fabozzi, Bhattacharya, and Berliner’s (2007) 
textbook of mortgage-backed securities makes effectively no mention of correlation. 
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pool of subprime, high loan-to-value, low-documentation loans might be 40 percent.  
In other words, to achieve a AAA rating a tranche based on this pool would have to 
be able to survive the default of 40 percent of the mortgages in the pool.)  So the 
apparently assumed independence of mortgage defaults was, to quote an interviewee, 
only “conditional independence”: independence conditional on the macroeconomic 
variables condensed in the historical experiences that had given rise to the stress 
scenarios.26 
 
 Another potential source of correlation amongst mortgage defaults – the 
vulnerability of a pool of mortgages to local economic conditions – was also handled 
primarily by organizational procedures rather than mathematical modeling.  
Geographically concentrated pools were discouraged by applying ratings penalties 
(again expressed as increases to required credit support levels) to them.  With the 
main mortgage lenders – especially subprime lenders – increasingly operating across 
the US, there was no need for them to incur these penalties, and the mortgage pools 
they presented for rating were typically as diversified as possible geographically.  
(This unsurprising outcome had significant consequences, as we shall see later, in the 
evaluation of ABS CDOs.) 
 
 With the rating agencies analyzing the risk of default, prepayment remained 
the dominant concern of most investors in mortgage-backed securities.  For example, 
                                                
26 S&P’s stress scenarios also differed in the assumptions made about the severity of losses following 
default, with higher severities assumed in the stress scenarios for higher ratings, the rationale being that 
the house price declines in high-stress scenarios would imply lower proceeds following foreclosure.  
See Securities and Exchange Commission (2008, pp. 32-34) for the practices at Moody’s and Fitch. 
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the 2007 textbook on those securities mentioned in the introduction devoted its 
section on “valuation and analysis” almost exclusively to prepayment and other 
matters concerning changes in interest rates, with default scarcely mentioned in that 
section.  As the textbook put it, investors in “senior private label MBS” (in other 
words, in the upper tranches of private mortgage-backed securities) “typically assume 
that principal will be returned with 100% certainty … The driver of performance of 
these securities is thus not if, but when principal is paid to the bondholder” (Fabozzi, 
Bhattacharya, and Berliner 2007, p. 241, emphases in original). 
 
 The “100% certainty” was understandable.  The move into subprime was 
accompanied by considerably increased credit support levels, achieved not just by 
tranching but by two other safety mechanisms, “excess spread” and “over-
collateralization.”27  The resultant typical structure of a subprime ABS is shown in figure 
3.  As is shown there, around four-fifths of a typical subprime ABS was rated AAA, the 
same rating as enjoyed by the sovereign bonds of the US and other leading nations.  
Although it was universally understood that the default rate on the underlying subprime 
mortgages would be much higher than on prime, it would have taken what seemed an 
unimaginably high default rate to eat through all the excess spread, all the over-
collateralization, and all the lower tranches to reach the AAA tranches. 
 
                                                
27 “Excess spread” is the difference between the aggregate interest payments received from borrowers 
(net of fees and other payments) and the interest payments to investors; it creates what is in essence a 
reserve.  Overcollateralization means that the total principal sum of the loans in the pool is greater than 
that of the securities held by investors, either because the deal was structured that way initially or 
because of “turboing,” the use of excess spread to repay some investors and thus reduce the amount of 
securities still outstanding (Fabozzi, Bhattarcharya, and Berliner 2007, pp. 102 and 188). 
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- INSERT FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE - 
 
 Indeed, in practice excess spread and over-collateralization were in general 
sufficient to protect even the lowest of the investment-grade tranches (the “mezzanine” 
tranches, usually rated BBB), even when a mild recession caused the delinquency rate on 
subprime mortgages to double in six months in 2000 and remain high for the next two 
years (Sanders 2008, p. 256, chart 2).  Although there were some defaults (Erturk and 
Gillis 2005), they were concentrated mainly in a limited number of troubled deals, and 
left the majority of investors unscathed.  In retrospect, it is clear that historical 
contingency played a part in muting the losses in this episode, the first experience of 
recession since subprime mortgage lending had reached a large scale.  House prices 
continued to rise during it, giving some homeowners the option of selling rather than 
being foreclosed on, and in particular limiting lenders’ losses if foreclosure did take place 
(Calomiris 2009).  Indeed, ABS defaults of all kinds (not just of mortgage-backed 
securities) had been rare until that recession hit.  A February 2001 Moody’s report noted 
that “we often hear that no ABS security has ever defaulted” (Harris 2001, p. 13).  While 
not entirely consistent with the detailed default data in Erturk and Gillis (2005), the belief 
is indicative of widespread conviction in the safety of ABSs.  
 
 With default still not a major concern of most investors in subprime mortgage-
backed securities, the latter offered an advantage compared to prime securities in terms of 
the traditional evaluation focus, prepayment.  Although prepayment rates on subprime 
were usually higher than on prime mortgages, they were less sensitive to interest-rate 
changes, thus reducing what was from the investor’s viewpoint the traditional main 
drawback of mortgage-backed securities.  As lenders moved into subprime they were 
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able to weaken the entrenched features of “the American Mortgage.”  Floating-rate loans 
became much more common, as did prepayment penalties, especially penalties for 
prepaying during the increasingly-common period of relatively low – but still, in absolute 
terms, quite high – “teaser” rates (Bhardwaj and Sengupta 2008).  In consequence, as a 
chapter in another textbook put it, “the average lives of the residential [subprime] ABS 
are likely to be more stable for a given change in interest rates than the average lives of 
securities created from conforming [i.e. prime] loans” (McElravey 2006, p.371).  “No 
income verification” loans were particularly prized from the viewpoint of prepayment: 
“The capital markets pay a premium” for them, reported Adelson (2006c, p.14), “because 
such loans display slower prepayments (and despite the fact that the loans have greater 
credit risk).” 
 
 It would, however, be misleading to suggest that no investors in subprime 
mortgage-backed securities were concerned with default.  While those who bought the 
higher tranches did largely set it aside, those who bought the lowest externally-sold 
tranches (usually the “mezzanine” tranches, typically with a rating of around BBB, close 
to the bottom of investment grade) frequently performed their own evaluations of default 
risk, and they were in quite a powerful position.  Those tranches were “historically harder 
to sell,” an interviewee told me, but they usually had to be sold.  While the constructor of 
an ABS might be prepared if necessary to keep the very lowest tranche, retaining the 
larger mezzanine tranches as well was unattractive.  Many deals would simply not have 
been viable from their constructors’ viewpoint if no buyers for those tranches could be 
found, because those constructors would have needed too much capital of their own 
(many subprime lenders were quite thinly capitalized). 
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 When constructing a subprime ABS, therefore, those arranging it would often “try 
to place the BBBs first,” secure in the knowledge that the AAA tranches could easily be 
sold “to people who don’t want to think,” as another interviewee put it.  Mezzanine 
buyers were often sophisticated: they were “willing to spend the time to understand the 
collateral and the structure.”  Some, for example, had developed their own models of 
mortgage default rather than relying by proxy on the rating agencies’ models. These 
buyers could, and not infrequently did, demand to see the “loan tapes” (the electronic 
records of the underlying mortgages), which the buyers of higher tranches almost never 
did, and they had to be allowed a reasonable time (even as late as 2001-3, as much as a 
week, one such buyer told me) to analyze the contents of the tapes.  If they didn’t 
approve of what they found – for instance, over-large pockets of particularly risky 
mortgages hidden beneath the aggregate data in the offering documents – they might say 
“I don’t like the collateral,” and demand that the mortgage pool be changed before they 
would buy securities based on it. 
 
 All that was soon to change utterly.  However, before we can understand fully 
why it did so we need to follow an apparent historical detour.  At the end of the 1980s, 
the securitization of mortgages and other forms of consumer debt was joined by the 
securitization of corporate debt.  On the face of it, it was a small change: the structures of 
the new instruments, CDOs, were initially almost identical to those of ABSs.  Around 
them, however, a quite different cluster of evaluation practices was to develop. 
 
Corporate CDOs and the Emphasis on “Correlation” 
CDOs were originally a simple extension of the techniques employed in the “private 
label” securitization of mortgages and other forms of consumer debt.  Firms 
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constructing CDOs again set up special-purpose legal vehicles, and used the capital 
raised by the sale of securities to investors to buy pools of corporate debt: at first, 
bonds issued by corporations but soon also loans made to them.  The securities sold 
by CDOs were tranched in a way similar to a private-label mortgage-backed security 
(see figure 2). 
 
CDOs began in the exciting but risky fringes of the late-1980s bond market, 
which traded “junk” (speculative-grade) bonds, typically those issued by corporate 
raiders as a means of funding their take-over bids.  Although they differed in structure 
from most later deals,28 what appear to be the first CDOs were issued in 1987 by the 
San Diego-based Imperial Savings Association, in conjunction with the investment 
bank Drexel, Burnham, Lambert, whose heavy involvement in the junk-bond market 
was famously led by Michael Milken.  Sharply increased junk-bond default rates, the 
February 1990 bankruptcy of Drexel, and the imprisonment of Milken for securities 
violations temporarily returned junk bonds to the margins of finance.  However, from 
1996 on CDOs started being used on a large scale by banks to shed credit risk from 
their portfolios of loans to corporations and to reduce the capital reserves that 
regulators insisted they hold in respect to that lending.  In November 1996, the UK’s 
National Westminster Bank completed a $5 billion securitization of its loan book 
known as Rose Funding (previous CDOs had typically been a tenth of that size or 
smaller).  In 1997, further large CDOs were created by, amongst others, Swiss Bank, 
                                                
28 They were what would later be called “market-value CDOs”: the pool of junk bonds was revalued 
fortnightly, and if its value fell below a set threshold for more than two weeks investors could require 
that the pool be sold and their capital returned to them (Hourican 1990, p. 333).  
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NationsBank, Bank of Tokyo/Mitsubishi, Credit Suisse, ABN Amro, Rabobank, J.P. 
Morgan, and Sumitomo (First Union Securities, Inc. 2000).   
 
Success in selling these huge “balance-sheet CDOs” revealed that they were 
profitable in their own right, quite apart from their effects on the loan books and capital 
reserves of their parent banks: investors would buy their tranches at spreads that were 
sufficiently low that the aggregate flow of cash to those investors was less than the 
income generated by the loans in the CDO’s pool, so generating an arbitrage: a risk-free 
profit.  Balance-sheet CDOs were therefore quickly joined by what insiders explicitly 
called “arbitrage CDOs,” which would buy corporate bonds or loans on the open market 
and capture this arbitrage. 
 
As described above, the political economy of US mortgage lending led to 
evaluation practices focused primarily on prepayment.  The latter was a peripheral 
concern in the evaluation of CDOs (with no equivalent of government action on 
behalf of mortgagors, prepayment of corporate loans was generally either prohibited 
or subject to stringent penalties), and default was always the focus, with the rating 
agencies playing an essential role right from the start.  In the early balance-sheet 
CDOs, banks often did not let investors know the names of the corporations whose 
loans had been packaged and sold, fearing loss of those corporations’ business if they 
discovered that their bankers had publicly divested themselves of exposure to them.  
In that situation, investors had little but ratings to go on. 
 
 Rating agencies were told the composition of a CDO’s pool, and – at least in 
the US – the corporate debts that formed the pool would typically already have been 
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rated.  By the early 1990s the rating agencies had accumulated datasets of corporate 
defaults from which what they called the “idealized” default rates corresponding to a 
particular rating could be inferred.  (For example, Moody’s early 1990s’ estimate of 
the ten-year default rate of companies rated Aaa was 1.0 percent; for Baa companies, 
it was 4.4 percent.  See Lucas et al. 1991, p. 6.)  These databases could also be used to 
estimate recovery rates: the typical extent to which the loss following default was less 
than total.  For example, Hourican (1990, p. 338) noted that “Studies indicate that 
defaulted bonds trade at an average price of 40 percent of par [face value] one month 
after default.” 
 
 Default probabilities and recovery rates thus seemed knowable.  But how 
could they be combined to estimate the probability of different levels of loss in a 
CDO’s pool?  If corporate defaults were statistically independent events, then those 
probabilities could be calculated using only elementary probability theory.29  
However, it was also clear that the assumption of statistical independence was 
untenable: 
For example, among companies rated Ba at the beginning of 1974, 6.1% 
defaulted over the next 10 years, compared with 21.2% over the 10-year 
period beginning in 1981.  The magnitude of variations in these default rates 
suggest the presence of correlation, meaning that if one company defaults, 
there is a greater likelihood that others will default (Lucas et al. 1991, p. 2). 
 
                                                
29 Thus, for example, if both company A and company B have a default probability of 0.1, and their 
defaults are independent events, then the probability of them both defaulting is simply 0.1 x 0.1 = 0.01. 
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 As with mortgages, some of this correlation would be common exposure to the 
same macroeconomic conditions.  With no publicly-available model of correlated 
corporate defaults to draw on in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the rating agencies 
initially handled that issue using a “conditional independence” approach closely 
analogous to that used in rating mortgage-backed securities.  In evaluating CDOs, 
both S&P and Moody’s again “stressed” historically average corporate default 
probabilities by greater amounts for higher targeted ratings, and then used those 
stressed probabilities in a calculation that assumed defaults to be independent events.  
The additional correlation that would come from poorly diversified pools of assets 
(for example, loans heavily concentrated in a particular industry) was again handled 
procedurally, just as it had been for mortgages.  Thus S&P “notched” (reduced by one 
or more ratings grades) the ratings of all the debt instruments in any industrial sector 
that formed more than 8 percent of a CDO’s pool (interview data; Standard & Poor’s 
n.d., p. 36).30 
 
 These relatively simple ways of evaluating CDOs, in which correlation was not 
modeled explicitly but handled procedurally, changed more quickly than their 
counterparts for mortgage-backed securities and in quite a different direction.  The 
impetus for change was external to the rating agencies: the growing influence within 
banking of derivatives, notably options and interest-rate swaps.31  By the 1980s, 
                                                
30 Moody’s explicitly calculated a “diversity score” for CDO’s pool.  Fitch appears not to have had an 
explicit concentration penalty in this period. 
31 Options are contracts or securities that grant a right but not an obligation.  For example a “call” 
option gives the right to buy a block of shares at a set price – the “exercise price” – on, or up to, a given 
future date.  An interest-rate swap involves one party paying the other a fixed rate of interest on an 
agreed notional principal sum, while the second party pays a floating rate (usually Libor) on the same 
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professional traders of these derivatives did not simply evaluate them by following set 
procedures akin to those then used by the rating agencies, but employed explicit, 
sophisticated mathematical or economic models, many based on the eventually Nobel-
prize-winning Black-Scholes-Merton option model (Black and Scholes 1973, Merton 
1973).  These models had an impact on the evaluation practices surrounding mortgage-
backed securities – since prepayment is an option, one can apply option theory to 
calculate by how much it reduces a security’s value, and the Salomon team were known 
for their skill in this – but they brought about a far more radical change in the evaluation 
of CDOs. 
 
 Black, Scholes, and Merton had also applied their options work to modeling the 
value of a corporation’s debt.32 Oldrich Vasicek (a Czech-born probability theorist who 
had worked at Wells Fargo, where Black and Scholes were consultants) then showed how 
this approach could be extended to value a large, homogeneous, highly granular portfolio 
of corporate loans (Vasicek 1991).  Vasicek’s model was commercially confidential, but 
a more general computerized simulation version of it was incorporated into 
                                                                                                                                      
sum.  Introduced in 1981 (Beckstrom 1988, p. 43), interest-rate swaps quickly became widely used by 
banks and other market participants to manage the risks of interest-rate fluctuations. 
32 Because of their limited liability, the owners of a corporation’s shares possess what is in effect a call 
option on its assets.  If the market value of those assets is below the total amount of the corporation’s 
debt when the latter falls due, shareholders rationally should simply allow the corporation to default 
(leaving their shares worth nothing).  If the corporation’s assets are at that point worth more than its 
debt, their shares are in aggregate worth the difference.  Those outcomes are precisely the pay-off of a 
call option with an exercise price equal to the total amount of the corporation’s debt, and this allows 
option theory to be used in what has become known as the “Merton model” of default: see Merton 
(1974). 
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CreditMetrics, a system for measuring credit risk developed by J.P. Morgan.  The bank, 
which was a particularly active proponent of the credit default swaps discussed below, 
made both CreditMetrics itself and a detailed description of it (Gupton, Finger, and 
Bhatia 1997) available to other market participants, because (as an interviewee involved 
told me) it wanted to promote the market for these swaps by giving other banks a way of 
measuring how they could use them to reduce credit risk.  In these “Gaussian copula” 
models,33 correlation – previously handled procedurally and almost entirely implicitly – 
was modeled explicitly. 
 
 The creators of the big “balance-sheet” deals that made CDOs mainstream were 
typically not in banks’ securitization or junk bond departments but in their derivatives 
teams, especially those specializing in interest-rate swaps.  In consequence, despite the 
similarity in structure of ABSs and CDOs, the creators of the new wave of the latter 
thought of them not as securitizations but as “credit derivatives,” a term that first came 
into use in the early 1990s at Bankers Trust (see Sanford 1993, p. 239), a bank that was 
prominent in developing new derivatives to disaggregate and make tradable the different 
aspects of what an interviewee then employed there called the “bucket of risks” involved 
                                                
33 A copula function (a formulation introduced to mathematical statistics by Sklar 1959) “joins 
together” the distribution functions of uniformly-distributed variables in such a way as to yield a 
specific multivariate joint distribution function.  (A “Gaussian copula” yields a multivariate normal 
distribution function.)  Copula functions were brought to the study of credit risk by Li (1999 and 2000), 
who used them to specify the dependence amongst the survival or hazard-rate functions that model the 
time at which a corporation defaults.  When referring to “Gaussian copulas,” I also include models 
such as CreditMetrics and the original 2001 version of CDO Evaluator (discussed below), which are 
single-period (all that is modeled is whether a corporation defaults during the period in question, not 
when), but in which what is in Li’s terms the copula function is Gaussian. 
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in lending.  Sometimes the derivatives teams discovered only accidentally that others in a 
different department of the same bank had long experience of similar structures: 
 
… one of the salespeople in Bank of America was in our Chicago office 
[in 1997], getting a cup of coffee, showing it [a planned CDO-like 
instrument] to a colleague.  The guy behind [an ABS specialist] leans over 
and says, “that’s a really neat idea.”  He’s been doing that for years … 
securitizing … putting diversified pools of assets into a vehicle and 
tranching off the risk … 
 
 By the mid-1990s, the derivatives teams already inhabited a world in which 
sophisticated mathematical models were central, and they were quick to adopt Gaussian 
copula models of CDOs (interview data; Tett 2009a).  That then made purely procedural 
ratings techniques such as notching begin to seem outdated: as one interviewee employed 
at a rating agency in this period told me, notching was “not a proper correlation method.”  
All three main agencies largely switched to evaluating CDOs using Gaussian-copula 
software systems: S&P with its November 2001 CDO Evaluator, Fitch with its July 2003 
Vector, and Moody’s with its May 2004 CDOROM.34   
 
                                                
34 See, e.g., Chen et al. (2005, p. 7, exhibit 3).  Moody’s had developed a distinctive approach in which 
a CDO’s “diversity score” (see note 30) was used to map its asset pool onto a hypothetical pool of 
homogeneous assets whose defaults were independent events and to which, therefore, the binomial 
formula from elementary probability theory could be applied (Cifuentes and O’Connor 1996).  Its 
commitment to this “binomial expansion technique,” which is much simpler than Gaussian copula 
formulations, meant it embraced Gaussian copula models more slowly and more partially than S&P 
and Fitch. 
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By making credit correlation explicit for the first time, these and other copula 
models raised the issue of how to measure it.  It was a crucial issue: the assumption of 
low levels of correlation was at the very core of the rationale for CDOs, especially 
arbitrage CDOs.  They depended on being able to take a diversified pool of corporate 
bonds or loans with relatively modest ratings (and the high spreads that went with those 
ratings), and package them into a structure that would have large tranches with higher 
ratings.  Those tranches could then be sold at lower spreads, and the difference could be 
pocketed as arbitrage profits.  Low correlation was what made the high ratings justifiable 
and the arbitrage feasible, in effect making relevant the analogy with coins tossed 
independently.  (One coin can easily turn up tails; twenty independently-tossed coins are 
most unlikely to.)  If the correlations amongst them were low, a large portfolio of 
corporate bonds or loans was most unlikely to suffer the large number of defaults that 
would endanger a CDO’s AAA tranche, even if each of those individual bonds or loans 
was rated BBB or even BB. 
 
In the way Gaussian copula models were formulated in the late 1990s at banks 
such as J.P. Morgan, which had overtaken Bankers Trust as the leading player in the 
credit derivatives market (Tett 2009a), the correlation between two corporations was the 
correlation between the changing market values of their assets.  However, this market 
value is not directly observable (it can diverge radically from the “book” value of those 
assets on a corporation’s balance sheet).  So, as a former J.P. Morgan trader told me, they 
– and also others in banks using Gaussian copula models – simply took the readily 
measurable correlation of two corporations’ stock prices as a proxy for their unobservable 
asset-value correlations, even if doing so had, as one textbook put it, “no theoretical 
justification” (Chaplin 2005, p. 260). 
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With the exception of Fitch, which adopted a modified version of this way of 
estimating correlation, the rating agencies took other approaches more deeply rooted 
in their organizational practices.  When Moody’s started using Gaussian copula 
models, its modelers either used estimates based on the judgments of experienced 
ratings staff or values implied by patterns in the records of their actions in 
downgrading or upgrading corporations (Fu et al. 2004).35  When Standard & Poor’s 
was designing its new Gaussian copula system, CDO Evaluator, released in 
November 2001, it did seek econometrically to estimate the correlation values that 
would yield the degree of clustering of corporate defaults that had historically been 
encountered (Parisi 2004, p. 2).  However, the limited number of cases in its default 
database as it stood then made that estimation hard (only with version 3.0 of 
Evaluator released in December 2005, when the default database was much larger, 
did S&P fully embrace these estimates), so consistency with previous organizational 
practice was also a criterion that shaped the original choice of correlation parameters.  
In line with the “conditional independence” approach used prior to the Gaussian 
copula, the correlation between firms in different industries in the original version of 
Evaluator was set at zero (Bergman 2001), with dependence on common 
macroeconomic conditions captured by continuing to “stress” default probabilities, 
raising them most if a AAA rating was sought.  The choice in that original version of 
0.3 for the correlation between corporations in the same industry similarly reflected 
                                                
35 Moody’s also used correlations produced from analysis of market prices by KMV, a firm co-founded 
by Vasicek, which it bought in 2002.  KMV employed an elaborated version of the option-theoretic 
model outlined in note 32 to estimate corporations’ asset values and default probabilities.  In their 
choice of correlation assumptions, however, the CDO specialists at Moody’s “tilt towards the ratings-
based results” (Fu et al. 2004, p. 10). 
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previous practice, an interviewee told me.  0.3 was chosen “partly to maintain 
consistency with the previous notching scheme”: when applied to similar asset pools 
it tended to generate similar results, i.e. similar ratings and credit support levels.  
 
Although no-one at the time could have foreseen it, this apparently small, 
technical decision in late 2001 (the choice of an intra-industry correlation of 0.3) was 
pivotal to the chain of events that I will turn to in the next section.  First, though, other 
ways in which the arrival of derivatives specialists transformed securitization need 
considered.  They brought with them a new instrument originally developed in the 
early 1990s at Bankers Trust (Tett 2009a, p. 24): the credit default swap.  It is a 
bilateral contract in which one party, the “protection buyer,” pays regular premiums 
to the other party for “protection” against default by a third party (Ford Motor 
Company, for instance) on bonds issued by it and/or loans made to it.  Should Ford 
default, the protection buyer has the right to deliver Ford’s bonds or loans to the 
protection seller, and receive their full face value.  The protection buyer does not need 
to hold Ford’s bonds or loans: it can simply purchase them at the point at which they 
have to be delivered (following default they will be trading at a fraction of their face 
value). 
 
 As the former Bank of America credit derivatives specialist put it to me, credit 
default swaps gave him and his colleagues a capacity the ABS world of the sarcastic 
coffee-queue interlocutor quoted above did not have, for all its much longer experience of 
securitization: “what he couldn’t do … was synthetically transfer” credit risk.  Swaps 
made “synthetic” CDOs possible.  Instead of the special-purpose legal vehicle having to 
buy loans or bonds for its asset pool, it could simply sell protection on them via credit 
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default swaps, using the premiums it received from the swaps to pay the investors in the 
CDO.  Those investors faced a broadly similar pattern of risks and returns (again, for 
example, investors in the lowest tranche were first to lose their capital, in this case if one 
or more of the swaps was triggered by default on the bonds and/or loan it covered), but a 
synthetic CDO was quicker and easier to construct than a cash CDO, as the CDOs 
involving the actual purchase of assets were called.  Credit default swaps also made 
single-tranche CDOs possible.  Such a CDO does not involve a separate legal vehicle: it 
is simply a bilateral contract between an external investor and a dealer (typically a credit-
derivatives trading desk at a major bank), in which the investor earns regular fees by 
selling the dealer protection on a particular tranche of losses on a mutually-agreed pool of 
corporate bonds and/or loans.  Introduced in around 2001, by 2003 single-tranche deals 
dominated the corporate CDO market (Reoch 2003, p. 8).  Because they too were 
synthetic (the corporate loans or bonds in question served simply as a reference pool, a 
way of defining the deal; they didn’t have to be bought), single-tranche CDOs could be 
set up almost immediately: “single-tranche technology is all over in a week,” said the 
above interviewee.  “You dream up the portfolio on a Monday, structure on the 
Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday.” 
 
 Single-tranche CDOs greatly increased the salience of “correlation.”  Even once it 
has been completed, a single-tranche CDO leaves a dealer with a position that needs 
hedged.  (The dealer has bought protection, and thus the hedges will consist 
predominantly of sales of protection.  Since these are income-generating, they earn the 
dealer the money to pay the investor and earn a profit from the deal.)  This hedging was 
not a simple task, because the fluctuating value of a tranche reflects not just changes in 
the perceived individual creditworthiness of the corporations in the CDO’s reference pool 
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but also changing beliefs about the likely clustering of defaults – in other words, about 
“correlation.”  To help them hedge the latter, in 2003-4, the main credit-derivatives 
dealers set up markets in tranched, tradable credit “indices,” which they could use to 
trade correlation.  (That realist phrasing is deliberate: “correlation” was increasingly 
talked about, for example in the trade press, not as a parameter of a model but as a real 
phenomenon with real implications.)  Such an index resembles a standardized synthetic 
CDO – in most cases with a fixed list of 125 corporations each making up 0.8 percent of 
its reference pool – and protection can be bought or sold on either the index as a whole or 
on standard tranches of it.  The indices (which quickly became liquid, high-volume 
markets) provided a new way of estimating correlation.  A Gaussian copula or similar 
model could be applied “backwards” to infer the correlation levels consistent with the 
prices of protection on index tranches.  (E.g. if the cost of protection on higher tranches 
has increased, but the cost of buying protection via credit default swaps on the individual 
corporations making up the index is unchanged, it can be inferred that participants’ 
estimates of correlation have increased, or indeed, if one wants to be fully realist, 
“correlation itself” has increased.) 
  
Along with broadly canonical-mechanism markets in credit default swaps that 
had also emerged (see, e.g., Rule 2001), the tranched index markets were the 
foundation of a wider epistemic change that seemed well underway at the time of the 
first interviews for this research, in 2006-7.  The models used by the rating agencies 
to evaluate CDOs and ABSs such as mortgage-backed securities were explicitly 
backward-looking: their parameters were mainly either crystallizations of previous 
organizational practices or estimated using data from recent or (in the case of the 
Great Depression) distant historical experience.  The new canonical-mechanism 
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markets freed CDO modeling from these organizational and statistical traces of the 
past: for example, both correlation and default probability could be inferred from 
today’s market prices, not past experience. 36 
 
The change sharpened already-existing differences between the evaluation 
practices surrounding ABSs and CDOs, but it was never complete: amongst the rating 
agencies, only Moody’s made much use of this approach, and even there it was only 
as a complement to more traditional techniques.  It did however seem a harbinger of 
the eventual complete integration of CDOs into the full cognitive world of modern 
derivatives modeling.  The “quants” who populated that world – who often had PhDs 
in mathematics, physics, or engineering – could seem very alien to ABS specialists 
who prided themselves on understanding the everyday material and legal realities of 
lending.  As one of the latter complained to me, those quants had “never gone out to 
collect any money,” whether “with lawsuit or baseball bat.”  In consequence, they 
“didn’t have to be very intimate with the underlying,” in other words with the debts 
that ultimately underpinned the instruments whose prices they modeled: they “could 
treat it as an abstraction.”  For a brief moment, nonetheless, it seemed as if the future 
might be theirs. 
 
The Evaluation of ABS CDOs and the Arbitrage Opportunity it Created 
However, alongside the world of corporate CDOs, with its increasingly sophisticated 
products and models, another world of CDOs had developed: CDOs in which the 
underlying assets were tranches of ABSs, residential mortgage-backed securities in 
                                                
36 To be more precise, what can be inferred is the “risk-neutral” probability of default (see Baxter and 
Rennie 1996). 
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particular.  Viewed from the corporate CDO world I have just described, ABS CDOs 
could seem laggards: a “very boring part” of the market, as one interviewee put it, in 
which profit came only from “originating transactions; it didn’t come from risk-taking, it 
didn’t come from like good credit assessment.  It was purely, you know, in structuring 
fees.”  The main industry body, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 
standardized the terms of credit default swaps on ABSs only in June and December 2005 
(Damouni 2005), six years later than it had done so for their corporate equivalents.  The 
single-tranche CDOs that reshaped the corporate CDO world were relatively rare in the 
world of ABSs.  A set of tradable ABS indices (the ABX) was launched only in January 
2006, and a tranched ABS index (TABX) only in February 2007.  As innovations of this 
kind, originating in corporate CDOs, were replicated for ABS CDOs, the latter 
nevertheless would catch up, an interviewee told me in January 2007: “the asset-backed 
arena … is going to ape, I think, the corporate … [The] ABS market will get there in half 
the time it took the corporate market.”  Before that could happen, however, ABS CDOs, 
that “boring part” of the market, were to be at the core of the greatest financial crisis for 
the best part of a century.   
 
ABS CDOs emerged in the second half of the 1990s, though they formed only 
a small market (of the 283 CDOs issued in 1997-99, only eight were ABS CDOs: 
Newman, Fabozzi, Lucas and Goodman 2008, p. 34, exhibit 1), and originally had 
structures quite different from those of the decade to come.37  What is to my 
knowledge the first with that structure was issued in 1999 by a team at Prudential 
                                                
37 As far as I can tell, deals prior to 1999, such as what seems to be the first ABS CDO, the Alliance 
Capital/Paine Webber “Pegasus One Ltd,” issued in June 1995, were mostly market-value CDOs (see 
note 28 above). 
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Securities involving Chris Ricciardi, who was later to help make Merrill Lynch into a 
giant-scale constructor of ABS CDOs.  The team found themselves at a disandvantage 
in corporate CDOs, because Prudential had little involvement in the forms of 
corporate lending then popular as asset pools.  However, as Ricciardi told the trade 
magazine Credit, “Once you have CDOs, people ask, ‘what else can I do with 
CDOs?’” (Fahmy 2005).  Prudential had a large ABS business, and Ricciardi noticed 
that some classes of ABS – such as the subordinate tranches of ABSs whose pools 
were second-lien mortgages – offered higher spreads than equivalently-rated 
corporate debt.  So the arbitrage that could be achieved by packaging corporate debt 
into a CDO could be done even more profitably with ABSs.   
 
 The attractiveness of ABS CDOs similar to the Prudential deal was greatly 
enhanced by the 2000-2002 downturn, which led to defaults and bankruptcies (e.g. of 
over-ambitious telecoms providers) that caused substantial losses to investors in the 
lower tranches of many corporate CDOs.  In that context, the excellent performance 
record of mortgage-backed securities made them seem an attractive substitute for 
corporate debt.  In a single year, ABS CDO issuance more than doubled (to in excess of 
$20 billion in 2001) and the ABS share of the CDO market roughly tripled (Hu 2007), 
and issuance continued to grow sharply thereafter: in 2006 alone, ABS CDOs totaling 
$307.7 billion were issued.38  While the pools of the early ABS CDOs often contained 
ABSs from a wide variety of sectors – such as securitizations of aircraft and equipment 
leases, auto loans, and credit-card receivables (Roy and McDermott 2007) – several of 
those sectors also suffered badly in the downturn (Adelson 2003, Perraudin and van 
                                                
38 Data from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (http://www.sifma.org, 
accessed July 21, 2009). 
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Landschoot 2004).  Accordingly, ABS CDOs increasingly replicated Prudential’s design.  
By 2004, it was common for three quarters or more of the pool to consist of subprime 
mortgage-backed securities (Whetten and Adelson 2005, p. 2). 
 
By the end of the 1990s, CDOs had largely split off organizationally from the 
world of securitization and ABSs from which they had sprung: they were the province 
of different teams or even different departments of banks.  There were therefore often 
fierce battles over which team or department should have responsibility for the new 
and highly profitable ABS CDOs.  An interviewee at one leading investment bank, for 
example, described how there had previously been a clear division of labor between 
its Structured Transactions team, which handled corporate CDOs, and its Securitized 
Products Group, which had responsibility for ABSs.  The influential head of the latter 
told the former that they “can’t do that [ABS CDOs] without us,” and eventually a 
compromise was reached to conduct the activity jointly with a “50:50 split on 
revenue.” 
 
 The arbitrage that was the basis of the profitability of ABS CDOs depended 
entirely on the ratings of their tranches, and by the late 1990s the rating agencies also 
had evolved a division of labor, at least in their large head offices in New York 
(analysts were sometimes less specialized in smaller offices such as those in London). 
Unlike in the banks, though, there seems to have been little conflict over who should 
have responsibility for rating ABS CDOs: in all three agencies, the CDO team took on 
the new ABS CDOs, using the ratings of the underlying mortgage-backed securities 
or other ABSs that their ABS colleagues had already produced.  That organizational 
division of labor mirrored the existing division for corporate CDOs, in which the 
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CDO teams reused ratings of the underlying corporate debt produced by their 
colleagues in the department that rated corporate bonds.  (Such conflict as did take 
place seems mainly to have concerned ABS CDOs in which the underlying ABSs had 
not been rated by the agency in question, but only by others.  At least one Moody’s 
analyst took the view that it was improper to rate an ABS CDO under these 
circumstances.39  In general, though, it was regarded as acceptable when rating an 
ABS CDO to use another agency’s ratings of the ABSs, at least so long as one 
“notched” them – i.e. slightly reduced these ratings – if the other agency could be 
viewed as less rigorous.) 
 
Mapping the evaluation of ABS CDOs onto the organizational structure of rating 
agencies in this way had the additional advantage of minimizing the additional work that 
needed done.  By in effect treating ABSs as if they were corporate bonds or loans, 
existing CDO models could be used with little or no modification.  Of the three necessary 
sets of parameters, the first two – the default probabilities of the ABSs in a CDO’s pool, 
and their recovery rates in the event of default – could again be estimated relatively 
easily: the former from ABSs’ ratings, with corrections increasingly made for the 
growing evidence that ABSs were less likely to default than corporate bonds with the 
same rating (see, e.g., Roy and McDermott 2007); and the latter from data on the limited 
number of ABS defaults that had taken place (Erturk and Gillis 2005; Tung, Hu, and 
Cantor 2006).  Again, though, correlation posed the rating agencies the most challenging 
problems.  (Recall that if correlation is high it is impossible to form large highly-rated 
                                                
39 See the Moody’s email correspondence made public by the House of Representatives Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20081022112230.pdf, 
accessed March 30, 2009. 
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tranches from a pool of assets with only modest ratings.)  All three of the routes, 
discussed in the previous section, by which knowledge of corporate credit correlation was 
generated were largely blocked when it came to ABS correlation.  First, there was no full 
equivalent of corporations’ stock prices to use, because ABSs did not trade in a 
canonical-mechanism market.  Second, the very advantage of ABSs – the rarity of ABS 
defaults – made extracting a reliable correlation estimate by analysis of the clustering of 
defaults even harder than in the corporate case.  Third, until February 2007 (at which 
point the TABX index touched on in the next section was introduced) there was no 
tranched ABS index market from which beliefs about correlation could be inferred.   
 
That left essentially two choices: either estimating correlations from the 
performance record of ABSs as crystallized in an agency’s own previous actions in 
upgrading or downgrading ABS tranches (these ratings transitions are more plentiful than 
defaults, thus easing the estimation problem), or directly employing human judgment.  
Moody’s used baseline estimates based on ratings transitions, with judgmental additions 
(Toutain et al., 2005).  Fitch’s correlation estimates were based on “expert assumptions” 
(Zelter 2003, slide 5; see also Gill et al. 2004, p. 10).  Standard & Poor’s attempted to 
estimate ABS correlation econometrically, and my sources conflict on the success of the 
effort.  Parisi (2004, p. 2) suggests that correlations were estimated in this way, while an 
interviewee reports: “We did try to estimate ABS correlations, but the data was too 
limited to derive reliable/stable estimates, given the relative stability of ratings, paucity of 
defaults and the number of different asset classes with different dynamics resulting from 
different transaction structures and underlying assets.”  According to this interviewee, 
consistency with previous practice again played a role, in particular in the choice of the 
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same correlation, 0.3, between ABSs in the same sector (i.e. same type of lending) as was 
used for corporations in the same industry. 
 
Moody’s estimates of the correlation between ABSs in the same sector (such as 
subprime mortgages) were also around 0.3.40  Fitch’s explicitly judgment-based ABS 
correlations were higher than S&P’s and Moody’s: Whetten and Adelson (2005, p. 2) 
report the use at Fitch of intrasectoral ABS correlations in the range 0.3 to 0.55, and 0.55 
seems to have been the figure used for subprime residential mortgage-backed securities.  
However, for reasons to do with how Fitch implemented its Gaussian copula model, its 
0.55 may not in practice have been more onerous in its effects on ratings than S&P’s 
0.3.41  In addition, Fitch was in relative terms an increasingly marginal player.  S&P and 
Moody’s each rated between 85 and 95 percent of all CDOs (ABS and CDO investors 
                                                
40 For example, the baseline correlation between US subprime residential mortgage securities assumed 
by Moody’s was 0.22.  That would be increased to take into account factors such as the closeness of 
the vintage (year of issuance) of the ABSs: e.g. by 0.1 for the commonly encountered case of pairs of 
mortgage ABSs of the same vintage (Toutain et al. 2005).  
41 S&P’s Evaluator was, at least originally, a single-period model that (in the case, say, of a pool of 
assets all with a five-year maturity) would encompass the entire five years in a single simulation run.  
Fitch’s Vector was a multi-period model that was run in annual steps: “At every annual step [in a 
simulation] an asset portfolio is updated by removing defaulted assets and recording amounts and 
recoveries upon default” (Gill et al., 2004, p. 9).  As far as I am aware, the annual steps were serially 
independent, so as an interviewee put it, an asset “that survives the first period will start the second 
period with a ‘clean slate.’”  Since the probability of default of any asset in a single year will normally 
be assumed to be much lower than default of the same asset over five years, this tends to have the 
effect of generating fewer cases with large numbers of defaults in a multi-step model than in a single-
step model with the same correlation parameters.  In consequence, “we need to increase correlation [in 
a multi-step model] to ‘match’ the cumulative distribution of the single-step model” in this respect. 
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typically expect instruments to have ratings from at least two agencies), while Fitch’s 
share of CDO ratings slipped from around 65 percent before 2004 to around 15 percent in 
2006-7 (Barnett-Hart 2009, p. 18, figure 8).  In consequence, the rating of ABS CDOs 
was in practice done by assuming a correlation of 0.3 (in the case of S&P) or close to 0.3 
(in the case of Moody’s) between ABSs from the same sector, such as subprime 
residential mortgages. 
 
It was a consequential assumption.  A correlation of 0.3 or thereabouts made it 
possible not just to package the higher tranches of subprime or similar mortgage ABSs 
into “high-grade ABS CDOs,” but also to package their mezzanine tranches into 
“mezzanine ABS CDOs.”  As shown in figure 4, the AAA tranches of the latter would be 
smaller in aggregate than in high-grade ABS CDOs, and some use of excess spread (see 
note 27) would normally be needed to achieve the requisite level of credit support.  
Nevertheless, to be able to take BBB raw materials and fashion a product that was mainly 
AAA was an enticing arbitrage opportunity, and it was one that was pursued with great 
vigor in the years immediately prior to the crisis. 
 
- FIGURE 4 AROUND HERE – 
 
The arbitrage was a result that was possible only because of the assumption of 
relatively modest correlation: one interviewee told me that assuming 0.5, rather than 0.3, 
would have undermined the arbitrage, leaving mezzanine ABS CDOs economically 
unviable.  Given that – and given the dependence of rating agencies on fees earned from 
the issuers of securities, and the possibility of those issuers “ratings shopping” (choosing 
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the agencies that offer the more favorable ratings) – should we interpret the choice of a 
correlation of 0.3 or thereabouts as strategic behavior guided by anticipated fee income? 
 
Consider, for example, S&P’s choice of 0.3 as the intrasectoral ABS correlation 
parameter for CDO Evaluator (the first of the rating-agency Gaussian copula systems, 
released, as noted, in November 2001).  The ABS CDOs of that period were far more 
diversified across sectors than later deals, and subprime residential mortgage-backed 
securities typically made up only 30-40 percent of their asset pools (Whetten and 
Adelson 2005, p. 20).  In that context, the choice of correlation between sectors is at least 
as important to rating outcomes as correlations within them, because the correlation 
matrix will contain more intersectoral than intrasectoral correlations.  S&P’s choice of 
0.1 for the former (Bergman 2001) was more stringent than the figure of zero it employed 
for interindustry correlations, and higher than the values of 0.04 to 0.06 Moody’s was 
later to derive from analysis of ABS ratings transitions (Toutain et al., 2005, p. 13). 
 
Amongst that backdrop, S&P’s choice of 0.3 as the intrasectoral ABS asset 
correlation could actually be interpreted as cautious, more cautious, at least in the case of 
mortgages, than a purely econometric estimate: Parisi (2004) reports an average 
correlation of 0.06 of the losses on pairs of pools of US residential mortgages in the 
period 1995-2002.  If the interviewee quoted above is correct in reporting that a major 
influence on the choice was the use of 0.3 as the intraindustry correlation assumption, 
then it was the transfer to the rating of ABS CDOs of an assumption that was at least 
sometimes seen in its original context as “overly conservative” (Chen et al. 2005, p. 3n).  
There was sharp controversy about one of the correlation assumptions in S&P’s 
Evaluator, but it concerned the zero interindustry correlation (the remaining trace of the 
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older evaluation practices incorporating stressed scenarios and conditional 
independence),42 not the 0.3 intrasectoral ABS correlation.  As far as I can tell, no-one at 
the time foresaw, at least at all clearly,43 that the effects of the choice of 0.3 would in fact 
be far from conservative. 
 
If the choice of 0.3 or thereabouts as the intrasectoral ABS asset correlation was 
the chief proximate precondition of the arbitrage that fueled mezzanine ABS CDOs,44 the 
background precondition was the separate evaluation first of the ABSs in the CDO’s 
asset pool and then of the CDO itself.  As suggested above, that was the “natural” way to 
map the evaluation task onto the organizational structure of the rating agencies, but it is 
also clear, with hindsight, that this two-step organizational division of labor fed the 
arbitrage.  The justification of awarding high ratings to securities based on a pool of 
assets of only moderate credit quality is ultimately the diversification of that pool.  In that 
sense, diversification can be a “free lunch”: at little additional cost, it dilutes away almost 
all the idiosyncratic risk posed by an equivalently-sized holding of a particular asset, 
                                                
42 In an interviewee’s words, “everyone said, ‘how can you have no correlation between industries?’”  
For examples of the criticism, see Chen, Cifuentes, Desai, and Ray (2005) and Adelson (2006b). 
43 Perhaps the closest was Adelson (2003), who argued that evaluation practices surrounding both 
ABSs and CDOs understated correlation and ignored the way in which it can rise in a downturn.  Even 
here, though, there was no specific focus on the intrasectoral ABS correlation, and though Adelson’s 
hypothetical examples include a pool with a correlation of 0.6, the range of values (0.25 to 0.4) 
mentioned in his text (p. 59) as examples of when “correlation is higher” includes the value of 0.3 
chosen by S&P. 
44 The use for mortgage-backed securities of lower default probabilities and higher recovery rates than 
for equivalently-rated corporate bonds was also a facilitator.  Again, I can find no criticism of this at 
the time, and indeed default data seemed unequivocally to point in that direction. 
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leaving only the systematic risk posed by the exposure of all the assets to the same 
underlying economic factor or factors.45   
 
In the two-step process, however, the lunch was frequently being eaten twice, so 
to speak.  The rating of each ABS reflected the way in which the diversification of its 
pool of mortgages (including its geographical diversification) minimized idiosyncratic 
risk, and then diversification (in the form of the modest correlation assumption) was also 
taken to justify higher ratings of most of the CDO than of the component ABSs.  Here is 
where the organizational analogy between the evaluation of a CDO made up of corporate 
bonds and a CDO made up of ABSs was treacherous.  A corporate bond or loan will 
typically be high in idiosyncratic risk, hence the justification of giving higher ratings to 
tranches formed from a diversified pool of such bonds or loans than to its components.  
ABSs, however, often no longer contained much idiosyncratic risk that could be 
diversified away, but only systematic risk (exposure to common factors such as the risk 
of nationwide house price decline) that was not greatly reduced by packaging ABSs into 
                                                
45 There is a deeper issue here that cannot be explored fully for reasons of space.  This logic applies 
only if instruments are being evaluated according to their default probabilities or expected losses (as 
they were by the rating agencies and implicitly by those investors whose decisions were shaped by 
ratings), but modern asset-pricing theory suggests they should not be evaluated in this way: their price 
should reflect not this “total risk,” but only its systematic component, precisely because its 
idiosyncratic component can be diversified away.  Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009) argue that because 
of this the prices of corporate CDO tranches were too high by the standards of asset-pricing theory, and 
the ratings-spreads convention discussed in the introduction seems to be the cause: it led market 
participants unwittingly to compare instruments with high systematic risk (senior CDO tranches) to 
instruments with similar default probabilities but lower systematic risk (corporate bonds).  Their article 
is thus a beautiful demonstration of a convention shaping patterns of prices, and creating what is (if 
modern asset-pricing theory is correct) a very large and very persistent inefficiency. 
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a pool.  There is some evidence that relations between the ABS specialists and the CDO 
specialists in the rating agencies were not always good (an interviewee reports that in his 
agency “communication between the ABS and CDO groups was very poor”),46 but even 
if they had been harmonious this effect – the benefits of diversification being consumed 
twice – would have been created if each group had continued to follow its habitual 
practices. 
 
This issue – that in the two-step evaluation process the free lunch of 
diversification was often being eaten twice – also bears upon an argument frequently 
invoked by market participants prior to the crisis as implying the safety of ABS CDOs: 
that the US had never experienced a substantial nationwide house-price decline since the 
Great Depression, with sharp falls restricted to specific regions.  If that could be 
extrapolated into the future (and of course we now know it could not be), it did mean that 
the safety of ABSs was increased by geographical diversification.  However, it also was 
taken as indicating the even greater safety of ABS CDOs, which often added little further 
geographical diversification because the constructors of the underlying ABSs had already 
diversified them as much as possible to avoid ratings penalties.  
 
From this viewpoint, it is worth considering what would have happened if, instead 
of splitting the evaluation of ABS CDOs into two steps, conducted by two separate groups 
(the ABS group and the CDO group), the rating agencies had allocated the entire task to 
                                                
46 See also Adelson and Jacob (2008b, p. 8): “A key problem at many firms has been reluctance on the 
part of professionals in the areas of CDOs and structured credit to seek and accept input from 
ABS/MBS experts [MBS are mortgage-backed securities]. … Significantly, the problem was not 
confined to just one type of firm.  It was endemic among CDO and structured credit professionals at all 
kinds of firms: banks, securities dealers, rating agencies, bond insurers, money managers, and others.” 
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just one of the groups, and instructed it to use just its own techniques, developing those 
techniques as necessary, despite the very large amount of extra work that would have been 
created.  To ask what would have happened if an ABS CDO had been evaluated using 
solely the logistic regression or hazard-rate models and historically-based stress scenarios 
sketched in the second section of this article is an exercise in the counterfactual.  It would 
have required merging the loan-level data from multiple ABSs, applying those models to 
the entire merged pool, then modeling the cash flow consequences for each ABS of the 
predicted defaults and recoveries, and finally modeling the knock-on consequences for the 
CDO.  I have not found an instance of this being done, and interviewees seem to regard it 
as still not fully practicable, primarily for computational reasons.47   
 
What does seem clear, though, is that had it been technically feasible to rate a 
mezzanine ABS CDO using only ABS practices, doing so would have been unlikely to 
permit the CDO to have large AAA tranches.  When the mortgage default rates that 
characterized a AAA stress were applied to the giant merged pool, the cash flow to most 
                                                
47 For example, the cash-flow modeling would involve use of the huge commercially available “deal 
library” maintained by Intex Solutions (a firm based in Needham, MA), and those who have 
experimented with an approach of this kind tell me that practical complications (notably the fact that 
many ABS CDOs included tranches of other ABS CDOs in their pools) can cause the layered Intex 
models to run very slowly.  Considerations such as this remind us that (though I have not focused on 
this issue) evaluation practices are material practices, and their materiality is consequential. It is also 
worth noting that a different reason why it would not have been attractive to rate ABS CDOs in the 
way described in the text is that the managers of a CDO generally enjoy the right to sell assets from its 
pool and replace them with others with the same or higher ratings.  While it is quick and easy to use the 
conventional two-step approach to re-evaluate an ABS CDO whose pool has been changed in this say, 
the approach described here would have to be restarted from scratch, by forming and them re-analyzing 
a new merged pool. 
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of the BBB ABS tranches would most likely cease.  Cash flow into the ABS CDO would 
then be greatly reduced, and in consequence even its higher tranches would default, and 
would thus have had to be deemed not eligible for a AAA rating.  (Indeed, that is in 
essence what has actually happened.  The US mortgage market has suffered default rates 
that approach those of a AAA stress.  The AAA tranches of subprime ABSs have so far 
generally survived that stress – while many have suffered ratings downgrades, only a few 
have defaulted, as shown in table 1 below – but their BBB tranches often haven’t 
survived, and mezzanine ABS CDOs, which are composed mainly of those tranches, have 
therefore failed en masse.) 
 
 There are, however, not counterfactual but actual instances of the obverse: 
evaluating an ABS CDO using only CDO practices.48  In around 2006, some CDO 
specialists at one of the rating agencies tried as “a case of intellectual curiosity,” as one of 
them put it to me, to do just that.  They applied the oldest and simplest of all the Gaussian 
copulas – Vasicek’s model – to pools of mortgages, calibrating its correlation parameter to 
the typical ratings of ABS tranches (they found a value of between 0.3 to 0.4 to fit).  They 
then “allocate[d] losses randomly to each ABS deal … so that the frequency (and severity) 
with which each BBB ABS tranche defaulted could be recorded.  This allowed the 
correlation between each pair of ABS tranches to be calculated.”  The result was far from 
the modest level of 0.3 that generated the ABS CDO arbitrage: “This correlation turned 
                                                
48 Although analytically less relevant here because it concerned a bank, not a rating agency, it is worth 
noting that in around 2006 Goldman Sachs started modeling ABS CDOs in a way broadly similar to 
that described in the text (although the Goldman model of the underlying ABSs was calibrated to the 
spreads they offered, not their ratings).  The results also seem to have been significantly more 
pessimistic than those of the conventional two-step approach.  Unfortunately, my interview data do not 
throw light on whether these results played a role in Goldman’s crucial late-2006 decision to liquidate 
or hedge its mortgage-related positions. 
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out to be very high indeed, in the region of 0.8.”  Unfortunately, however, these specialists 
did not at that point have organizational responsibility for ABS CDO evaluation (“it 
wasn’t ‘under our watch’ at the time”), and they knew their “method was simplistic,” so 
they “never wrote it up” and took the issue no further. 
 
 The analysis they had performed is what participants call a “drilldown,” an 
evaluation of a structured financial instrument that does not simply re-use previous 
evaluations of its components but “drills down” to the assets underlying those 
components (in this case mortgages).  Additional evidence that the organizational 
division of labor, and not simply the pursuit of fees, mattered to the ratings evaluation 
of ABS CDOs comes from the contrast in this respect between the evaluations of 
them and of the instruments whose structure most closely resembled theirs: CDO2s 
(“CDO-squareds”).  These are CDOs whose asset pools consist of tranches of 
corporate CDOs.  CDO2s did not cross organizational divides in the way ABS CDOs 
did: they were firmly within the remit of the agencies’ CDO groups, which had 
responsibility for the evaluation both of the structure itself and of its components.  In 
this case, drilldown analyses were performed.  The CDO groups rated CDO2s by 
merging the asset pools of the underlying CDOs and applying their Gaussian copula 
systems to the merged pool. This evaluation practice meant that the “free lunch” of 
diversification was eaten only once in the evaluation of CDO2s, not twice as in the 
case of ABS CDOs.  It also took into account another potential source of correlation: 
the frequent presence of the debts of the same corporation in several of the CDOs 
whose tranches made up the asset pool of a CDO2.  Drilldown evaluation muted the 
attractiveness of CDO2s as arbitrage opportunities, and the sector never grew to 
approach anything like the scale of ABS CDOs. 
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ABS CDOs and the Causes of the Credit Crisis 
The overall performance of ABS CDOs is most easily tracked via the incidence of 
“events of default,” which are triggered by very poor performance of the underlying 
assets.49  While the ABS CDOs issued from 2001 to 2003 have not performed 
catastrophically by that metric, from 2004 on each successive vintage was worse than 
its predecessor.  Events of default have been declared in around 30 percent of ABS 
CDOs issued in 2005; in over 40 percent of those issued in the first half of 2006; in 
over 70 percent of deals from the second half of 2006; and in over 80 percent of deals 
from 2007 (Sakoui 2009).  By March 2010, events of default had been declared in 418 
CDOs totaling $371.6 billion, the vast majority of them ABS CDOs.50  The exact 
losses are still unknown (only 27 percent of those deals had actually been liquidated 
at that point) but the IMF’s October 2008 estimate, quoted in the introduction, of 
$290 billion still looks reasonable.  
 
                                                
49 Though there are a number of event-of-default tests laid down in the documentation of most CDOs, 
the critical issue is whether ratings downgrades or other reductions of the value of the CDO’s asset 
pool have been big enough to cause the pool’s total value to fall below the aggregate face value of the 
securities making up the CDO’s topmost tranches (those initially rated AAA).  That typically 
constitutes an event of default, following which control of the CDO passes from its managers to the 
“controlling class” of investors (normally the holders of the super-senior tranche), who have the right 
to declare an “acceleration” (which usually means diverting all cashflow to themselves) or to wind up 
the CDO by selling the assets in the pool (Goodman, Newman, Lucas, and Fabozzi 2007).  Either 
course of action will leave the holders of lower tranches facing losses that may be close to total, and 
even the holders of the super-senior tranche will in current circumstances incur substantial losses.   
50 See the CDO event-of-default list at http://www.totalsecuritization.com. 
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While losses on ABS CDOs have not been central to all the failures or near-
failures of major institutions (they played, for example, only a small part in the bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers: see Valukas 2010), their overall role has been large.  They triggered 
the bankruptcy in the early summer of 2007 of two hedge funds run by Bear Stearns, 
which was the single most clearly identifiable trigger of the crisis.  When the funds’ main 
creditor, Merrill Lynch, seized $850 million of their ABS CDOs on June 15, it found it 
could sell them only at around 20 percent of their face value, “triggering the repricing of 
CDOs around the world” (Onaran 2008).  The world’s largest insurer, AIG, was pushed to 
the brink of bankruptcy by write-downs of $33.2 billion (49.6 percent of its total losses) 
on credit default swaps via which it had sold protection on ABS CDOs.  The world’s 
largest bank, Citigroup, nearly suffered the same fate following $34.1 billion ABS CDO 
write-downs (61.6 percent of its total losses).  Merrill Lynch incurred calamitous $26.1 
billion ABS CDO write-downs, UBS a near-calamitous $21.9 billion, Ambac (a leading 
monoline insurer) $11.1 billion, Bank of America $9.1 billion, and Morgan Stanley $7.8 
billion.  Amongst the major institutions whose losses are analyzed by Benmelech and 
Dlugosz (2009), ABS CDO write-downs totaled around two and a half times the write-
downs on residential mortgage-backed securities themselves. 
 
 Of course, ABS CDO losses came from ABS losses, and those in turn stemmed 
from mortgage defaults.  By the end of 2009, 4.58 percent of all the residential mortgages 
in the US were in foreclosure (a rate without precedent since the Great Depression), and a 
further 10.44 percent were delinquent (one or more payments overdue), with rates for 
subprime or the intermediate category of Alt-A even higher: for example, 15.58 percent of 
subprime mortgages were in foreclosure, and a further 25.26 percent delinquent.51  The 
                                                
51 Data from Mortgage Brokers Association (http://www.mbaa.org), accessed March 21, 2010 
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result has been losses on ABSs hugely in excess of those assumed in the rating of ABS 
CDOs (see table 1), and those losses are the ultimate cause of events of default in the 
majority of recent ABS CDOs. 
 
-   TABLE 1 AROUND HERE - 
 
 These mortgage default rates have multiple, interacting causes, including the 
substantial falls in US house prices since 2006, the sharp rise in unemployment since 
2007, and the well-documented decline in the standards of US mortgage underwriting in 
the years prior to the crisis.  The burgeoning literature on the credit crisis has yet to reach 
a definitive judgment on the relative importance of these causes, and that is a task well 
beyond the scope of this article.  Most directly pertinent here are mortgage underwriting 
standards.  It is well-established – three existing papers, using different methodologies, 
have all found evidence of it52 – that the securitization of mortgages weakened the 
screening of applicants by the originators of these mortgages.  The likely reason is 
similarly well-understood, and not unique to the current crisis: securitized lending creates 
an agency problem by transferring many of the costs of default from loan originators to 
investors, a problem that is exacerbated if – as was often the case – the originators of loans 
are remunerated, directly or indirectly, according to the volume of loans they originate.  
Problems of this kind undermined all the various pre-1930 waves of mortgage 
securitization in the US (Snowden 1995).  For example, in the 1880s and early 1890s large 
numbers of mortgage companies issued bonds backed by Western farm mortgages.  The 
1890s’ depression saw most such companies fail, in part because “their local agents … 
                                                
52 Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2008); Mian and Sufi (2008); Rajan, Seru, and Vig (2008). 
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[g]enerally working on a commission basis … were overgenerous in approving loans” 
(Bogue 1955, p. 267). 
 
 For a quarter of a century from the 1977 rebirth of private-label mortgage 
securitization in the US, this ever-present agency problem was largely held at bay.  
Clearly, one important set of gatekeepers in this respect was the rating agencies, and much 
attention has focused on the question of whether they loosened their standards of 
evaluation of mortgage-backed securities in the years prior to the crisis (see, e.g., Smith 
2008a, b; Fligstein and Goldstein 2010).  Unfortunately, the snowballing process led me 
predominantly to rating-agency interviewees who were CDO specialists, not ABS 
specialists, so my interview data do not answer this question.  However, Ashcraft, 
Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery (2009) examine trends through time in the fraction of 
subprime and Alt-A mortgage-backed securities that were rated lower than AAA, taking 
into account both the extent of other forms of credit support (insurance and excess spread) 
and the characteristics of the underlying mortgage pools (the FICO score of the borrower, 
loan-to-value ratio, local-area house price changes, etc.).  They find that, controlling for all 
the other variables, the fraction rated below AAA went down by around 20 percent 
between mid-2005 and mid-2007 (see also Fligstein and Goldstein 2010). This is 
consistent with a decline in rating standards, and while Aschraft et al. “remain agnostic” 
whether the cause is “innocent errors” or “agency problems due to the ‘issuer pays’ credit 
rating model” (2009, p. 22), an extensive body of rating-agency e-mail messages released 
in April 2010 by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations does suggest both 
market-share pressures and a degree of internal doubt about the appropriateness of some 
ratings.53 
                                                
53 The e-mails are available at http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/, accessed April 27, 2010.   
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 It is worth noting, however, that this 20 percent decline in the fraction rated below 
AAA represents only a modest change in the structure of a typical subprime ABS: from 
lower tranches totaling around 24 percent of the structure to the 19 percent shown in 
figure 3.  The change is small relative to the huge differences – of between twelve-fold 
and over 300-fold – between the previous historical experience of ABS defaults (which I 
have shown in table 1 as it was captured in the default probability assumptions of CDO 
Evaluator)54  and the actual incidence of those defaults during the crisis.  Certainly, small 
causes can have big effects, but any analysis of the crisis that attributes it primarily to 
declining standards at the rating agencies would have to show a plausible mechanism by 
which that might have happened here. 
 
 It is, therefore, worth also considering the other gatekeepers, discussed in the 
second section: the traditional buyers of mezzanine ABS tranches, normally rated BBB 
(Adelson and Jacob 2008a).  By 2005-6, those investors, and the specialists who earlier 
had insured the mezzanine tranches, had been almost entirely displaced:  “About 90% of 
the recently issued triple-B-rated tranches [of subprime ABSs] have been purchased by 
CDOs” (Adelson 2006d, p.5).  The mezzanine ABS CDO managers who replaced them 
did sometimes try to be discriminating in their ABS purchases.  One, for example, told me 
how he and his colleagues tried to avoid ABSs constructed by the subprime lender 
Ameriquest, because they felt its lending standards were lower than those of its peers.  
                                                
54 The ABS default probabilities in Evaluator were obtained by “scaling” corporate default 
probabilities (which because of the larger numbers of corporate defaults were easier to estimate 
statistically) by factors that reflected overall differences between ABSs and corporate debt.  An 
interviewee told me that the “scaling factors were chosen to provide the best overall agreement with the 
(limited) historical data, such as the average transition behavior of ABS and corporate ratings.” 
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Another told me how, despite the fact that by 2005-6 the week that traditional mezzanine-
tranche buyers had been given to analyze ABSs had often shrunk to less than a day, his 
firm had nonetheless set up the expensive tools needed for that analysis in such a way that 
much of it could be performed “in an hour or two.” 
 
 However, what the constructor of a mezzanine ABS CDO could not do was avoid 
those tranches altogether.  As another interviewee put it: “So, you know, you talk to 
people [CDO constructors], and they’re complaining about the quality [of ABSs] … But 
they got a mandate to do the CDO, they got to get it done.  They got to buy something.  
So, ‘cos they want their fees.”  In particular, the constructors of ABS CDOs would still 
buy ABSs even when their spreads no longer seemed, to ABS specialists, to justify their 
risks: ABS CDOs “will not hesitate to bid spreads tighter than can be fundamentally 
justified so long as their ‘arb’ [arbitrage] can still be made to ‘work’” (Adelson 2006d, p. 
1).  Indeed, the aggregate demand from ABS CDOs for mezzanine tranches of ABSs 
exceeded total supply (as an interviewee put it, CDOs “were so into it, that the amount of 
paper being created wasn’t enough for them”), so even poorly regarded ABS constructors 
were still able to sell their mezzanine tranches, traditionally the hardest to place.  The 
gatekeeper role of the traditional buyers of those tranches thus vanished entirely. 
 
 To the extent that the removal of this second set of gatekeepers facilitated the 
loosening of standards of mortgage lending, ABS CDOs contributed to their own 
downfall.  They were also at the pinnacle of a broader change.  From 1970 to around 2000, 
mortgage securitization in the US could be described as predominantly being 
“securitization in order to lend” (a way of funding lending), and those who saw it like that 
had an incentive, over and above the presence of rating-agency and mezzanine-buyer 
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gatekeepers, to avoid poor-quality lending: even if defaults on securitized loans no longer 
directly impacted on them to any great degree, they would indirectly damage their 
organization’s reputation and thus endanger future funding.  In the following decade, 
however, these priorities were often reversed.  “Lending in order to securitize” became a 
dominant motivation, in other words making loans in order to capture the arbitrage profits 
to be reaped by packaging them into ABSs, and then packaging those ABSs into CDOs.  
The “assembly lines” – as market participants often called them – that did this packaging 
needed an ample supply of raw material, in other words of mortgages.  Demand for the 
latter was so strong that mortgage brokers found themselves the objects of eager attention 
from “wholesalers,” representatives of banks or other finance companies who would pay 
commissions to brokers for their clients’ mortgage applications.  Some wholesalers 
reportedly even offered sexual favors in addition to fees (der Hovanesian 2008). 
 
 As already suggested, however, the resultant decline in mortgage-underwriting 
standards needs weighed up against other causes of high default rates such as falling house 
prices, and while the ample, relatively low-cost funding provided by securitization 
contributed to the house price bubble that ended in these sharp house-price falls (see, 
especially, Mian and Sufi 2008), it was not the only cause of the bubble.  Furthermore, 
while mezzanine ABS CDOs were the crucial purchasers of the lower tranches of ABSs, 
high-grade ABS CDOs were only one source amongst others of the demand for higher 
tranches.55  So the argument that ABS CDOs contributed importantly to the US mortgage 
                                                
55 These other purchasers of the higher tranches of ABSs included “conduits” and “structured 
investment vehicles” (SIVs), which also sought a form of arbitrage profit. They were created by banks 
to invest in long-term, relatively high-yielding assets such as ABS tranches, while funding themselves 
more cheaply by the issuance of “commercial paper” (short-term debt).  It was, however, a genuine 
arbitrage only if commercial-paper funding remained available to the conduits and SIVs, which ceased 
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crisis by removing a crucial set of gatekeepers and encouraging the “lend to securitize” 
imperative remains a hypothesis, albeit a plausible one. 
 
 More definitively identifiable are the roles played by two further imports from 
credit derivatives to the world of ABSs: credit default swaps and tradable credit indices.  
Credit default swaps on ABSs made it possible, effectively for the first time, for traders in 
hedge funds and banks directly to bet against subprime mortgages.  Via a default swap, 
such traders could buy protection on an ABS tranche (normally a mezzanine tranche, with 
its high exposure to default) without needing to own the securities involved.  If the tranche 
defaulted, they would receive from the protection seller any shortfall in the money due to 
an owner of the securities, which would be a handsome return for modest protection 
premiums. 
 
 Such purchases of protection grew rapidly, especially after the terms of credit 
default swaps were standardized in 2005.  Even though they were underpinned by 
skepticism about the prospects for ABSs, they paradoxically had the temporary effect of 
further fueling the growth of ABS CDOs, because – in a situation in which, as noted, the 
demand from the constructors of ABS CDOs for mezzanine ABSs had outstripped supply 
– they made possible synthetic ABS CDOs.  Instead of buying ABSs, the latter sold 
protection on them, via credit default swaps, to traders betting against subprime 
mortgages, and used the swap premiums to pay investors.  The ABS CDO “system,” if 
                                                                                                                                      
to be the case once the crisis broke.  The rating agencies had insisted that the parent banks provide their 
conduits with pre-agreed credit facilities should this happen, and banks often, for fear of damage to 
their reputations, felt obliged to support their SIVs as well.  Those conduits and SIVs are thus another 
route, in addition to ABS CDOs, by which ABS losses were concentrated within the banking system. 
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one can call it that, thus quite literally absorbed the dissent that underlay the purchases of 
protection.  Indeed, as was highlighted by the April 2010 civil fraud action launched by 
the SEC against Goldman Sachs, in some cases the selection of ABSs for an ABS CDO 
reflected input from those (such as hedge fund manager John Paulson) who wished to use 
the CDO as a way of hedging their exposure to subprime or betting against it. 
 
 ABS credit default swaps and synthetic subprime ABS CDOs magnified the risks 
of mortgage lending.  If losses on the underlying mortgages reached a level that caused an 
ABS tranche to default, then more was at stake than the consequent losses to direct 
investors in that tranche such as cash CDOs.  All the credit default swaps on the tranche 
would also be triggered, causing additional losses, for example to synthetic CDOs that had 
sold protection on the tranche.  As ABS defaults mounted, the eventual result was massive 
transfers of wealth from ABS CDOs and other sellers of protection to the buyers of 
protection: hedge funds such as Paulson’s, and those banks – notably Goldman Sachs and 
Deutsche – that had also started to buy protection on a large scale, either as a way of 
hedging their positions or as a way of profiting from the coming disaster.  The total 
amount of such transfers is not known, but something of their scale is indicated by the fact 
that John Paulson made $15 billion for his fund in 2007, mainly in this way (Zuckerman 
2009).  To some extent, of course, these transfers were simply from one bank to another, 
but they were of sufficient size dangerously to erode the capital base of those banks that 
had been large net sellers of protection. 
 
 The second set of imports from the world of credit derivatives, tradable credit 
indices, rendered visible the extent to which banks’ assets had lost value.  Two new 
broadly canonical-mechanism tradable indices – the ABX, launched in January 2006, and 
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its tranched version, TABX, launched in February 2007 – allowed traders to buy and sell 
protection on standard packages of subprime ABSs.56  As the cost of buying protection on 
an ABX index rises, the level of that index falls, and because that level (unlike the price of 
individual ABS credit default swaps) was public, it rendered visible a decline in perceived 
creditworthiness.  The result of a greatly increased demand from hedge funds and banks 
such as Deutsche and Goldman to buy protection was that the ABX indices fell sharply 
early in 2007, and then again from the late spring onwards.  By early 2008, ABX levels 
implied the expectation of almost total capital losses on the BBB and BBB- tranches of the 
subprime ABSs they covered, and very large losses even on higher tranches (Fender and 
Scheicher 2008).   
 
 The banks that owned ABS CDOs and ABSs (many of the latter in “warehouses” 
awaiting packaging into ABS CDOs) generally held them in what are called their “trading 
books,” which meant – under current “fair value” accountancy regimes – that they had to 
be marked-to-market: i.e. revalued as market prices changed.  The ABX provided a market 
that could be used to do just that.  There was fierce dispute as to its adequacy – “ABX and 
TABX don’t really count as grown-up markets.  The market participants needed to create 
proper two-way flows in ABX remain elusive” (Hagger 2007) – and there were 
                                                
56 The ABX consists of five indices, each made up of one tranche from each of the 20 largest recently-
issued subprime ABSs.  (The 20 tranches making up the AAA ABX index all had initial ratings of 
AAA, and there are similarly-constructed AA, A, BBB, and BBB- indices.)  Buying and selling 
protection on the ABX index means entering into a credit default swap on the aggregate of the tranches 
making up the index in question.  Originally, a new set of benchmark ABSs was selected each six 
months, so creating a new “series” of the ABX.  This ABX “index roll” was suspended in December 
2007 because too few new ABSs were being issued (Creditflux 2007), and it has not subsequently 
resumed. 
 69 
accusations that even though tradable credit indices apparently were proper canonical-
mechanism markets, they could actually be manipulated (interview data; Hughes 2008).  
However, there was strong pressure from auditors (some fearful after the scandals and 
criminal convictions earlier in the decade, notably concerning Enron and WorldCom, of 
“any impression that they are going soft on clients”) to use the levels of the ABX to value 
banks’ holdings.  “It’s cover-your-ass stuff,” said one critic of the practice, but it meant 
that “Banks that mark assets far from where the indices trade incur the ire of their 
auditors” (anon. 2008, pp. 95-96).  
 
 Using the ABX, and such other market prices as were available, to value ABS and 
ABS CDO portfolios meant that such valuations were forward-looking: those prices 
incorporated predictions of defaults to come, not simply those defaults that had already 
happened.  In the eyes of the proponents of “fair value” accounting of this kind, these 
valuation practices appropriately rendered mortgage-related losses quickly visible.  In the 
eyes of its opponents, they worsened the crisis by making these predictions self-fulfilling, 
because they produced accounting write-downs of such a magnitude that they spilled over 
into “the real economy,” causing first an effective shutdown of subprime mortgage 
lending (leaving borrowers without opportunities to refinance, for example when “teaser” 
rates ended) and then a general collapse of other credit that led, inter alia, to a sharp rise in 
unemployment.  In so doing, those evaluation practices may have helped bring about the 
huge default rates on which they were predicated. 
 
 The final process that needs examined is how ABS CDO losses came to be highly 
concentrated in banking and insurance, given that instruments of that kind were expected 
to minimize the effects of losses of this sort by allowing the shedding of dangerous 
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accumulations of credit risk.  (Of the IMF’s estimate of $290 billion ABS CDO losses, at 
least half was incurred by banks, and a further 20-25 percent by insurers: see IMF 2008, p. 
9, table 1.1.)  The chief cause of the concentration of losses was that the safest tranches of 
ABS CDOs – the AAA super-senior tranches that typically made up more than half of 
even mezzanine ABS CDOs (see figure 4) – were hard to sell to outside investors, because 
the finite cashflow into an ABS CDO meant its super-senior tranche could offer only very 
modest spreads, usually around only 25 basis points (a quarter of a percentage point) over 
Libor, without overly reducing the spreads on the lower tranches. 
 
 Banks such as Merrill Lynch and Citigroup, with giant ABS CDO “assembly 
lines,” thus had little option but to retain most of their super-senior tranches, leaving them 
with huge exposures when defaults threatened even those tranches.  The credit default 
swaps via which banks bought protection on super-senior tranches from AIG and the 
monolines were the largest single cause of insurers’ losses.  Analytically most interesting, 
however (because they are most directly indicative of beliefs about super-senior ABS 
CDO tranches), are those cases in which traders at banks without large-scale involvement 
of their own in ABS CDOs nevertheless chose to buy super-senior tranches originated by 
other banks, or to sell those banks protection on them via credit default swaps. 
 
 Most fascinating of all these cases is a trade put on by a proprietary trading group 
at Morgan Stanley from September 2006 to January 2007.57  I first learned about this trade 
                                                
57 Other cases of banks buying super-senior ABS CDO tranches seem mainly to be so-called “negative 
basis trades,” in which a trader would buy a super-senior tranche (yielding annually around 25 basis 
points over Libor), buy protection on it from AIG or a monoline (for a premium around 15 basis points 
per annum), pay a charge around 5 basis points per annum to his or her bank’s treasury for tying up the 
bank’s capital, and thus be left with a profit of 5 basis points per annum.  (I draw these “round number” 
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in a February 2010 interview, and a fuller, but almost entirely consistent, account was then 
given by Lewis (2010, pp. 200-19), on which I also draw here.  The total loss on it was $9 
billion, just over half of the total credit-crisis losses that temporarily threatened the 
survival of the world’s second most prominent investment bank (Lewis 2010, p. 215; 
Benmelech and Dlugosz 2009, p. 163, table 1).58  What makes the trade interesting is that 
the Morgan Stanley group responsible for it was amongst those skeptical of the prospects 
                                                                                                                                      
figures from an interviewee familiar with the trade.  In the credit derivatives market, the “basis” is the 
difference between the cost of buying protection on an asset such as a CDO tranche and the spread that 
the asset offers; here the basis is negative, hence the trade’s name.)  Because the swap seemed to 
eliminate whatever modest credit risk was involved in the super-senior tranche of an ABS CDO, it 
enabled that tranche to be classed in banks’ risk management and accounting systems as fully hedged, 
which in turn allowed the full present value of the 5 basis point per annum profit to be “booked” 
immediately as “Day 1 P&L” (immediate profit: “P&L” is profit and loss).  UBS’s traders, for 
example, bought super-senior tranches totaling $20.8 billion, $15 billion of them for negative basis 
positions, and the latter were all judged “Day 1 P&L eligible” by the bank’s relevant division, Business 
Unit Control (UBS AG 2008, pp. 14-15 and 23).  Some traders may privately have doubted whether, in 
the cataclysmic scenario in which widespread losses were incurred even on super-senior tranches, the 
monolines or even AIG would have the financial strength to pay out, but in order to secure Day 1 P&L, 
“people bought protection they knew was worthless but that they know they will never need,” as a risk 
manager at another bank told me in an email message on April 8, 2008 (at which time the full extent to 
which they actually did need that protection was only gradually becoming clear).  That quotation 
suggests belief that the position was safe (and so suggests these cases are like the Morgan Stanley trade 
discussed in the text) and the interviewee who explained the economics of the trade also indicated to 
me that it involved genuine belief in the AAA ratings of super-senior ABS CDO tranches.  It is worth 
emphasizing, in this context, that though the trade was conducted on such a giant scale that it could 
threaten the survival of UBS, its profitability was modest.  At 5 basis points per year on $15 billion, the 
trade’s profit was $7.5 million per annum, which for a major bank is almost immaterial. 
58 Morgan Stanley’s purchases of protection on other ABS CDO tranches generated a profit of $2.3 
billion, hence the lower ($7.8 billion) total ABS CDO loss quoted earlier.  
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for the US mortgage market, and like others they had accumulated a large ($2 billion) 
“short” position in credit default swaps on BBB mezzanine tranches of ABSs, in other 
words a position that would pay out, via the swaps, if those tranches defaulted.  They were 
– rightly – convinced that the position would thus be extremely profitable, but until that 
happened it was what traders call a “negative carry” position: keeping it in place required 
expenditure (the premiums that had to be paid to the protection sellers).  A common way 
of eliminating the negative carry of a “short” BBB position (and of hedging against the 
possibility that one’s pessimistic view of creditworthiness is wrong) is to match it with a 
“long” AAA position in the sector in question, the rationale being that a decline in 
creditworthiness will have a far greater impact on BBB than on AAA assets, while the 
income from being long the latter (i.e. from holding them or selling protection on them) 
will eliminate the negative carry.  So the Morgan Stanley group did just that in late 2006 
and early 2007.  Unfortunately, though, they did this not by going long AAA ABS 
tranches, but going long AAA ABS CDO tranches.  They matched their $2 billion of 
purchases of protection on BBB ABS tranches with $16 billion or more of sales of 
protection on AAA super-senior ABS CDO tranches.  (The different in size – again 
perfectly understandable – reflected the fact that BBB tranches are far more sensitive to 
declines in credit quality and have much higher credit default swap premiums than 
AAA.59) 
 
 The difference between a AAA position in ABSs and in ABS CDOs may seem 
minor, but it changed the nature of the trade utterly.  The asset pools of the ABS CDOs in 
                                                
59 There is a discrepancy between my interview data and Lewis’s account concerning the exact ratio of 
the two positions and the rationale for it, but fortunately that is not crucial to the analytical import of 
the episode. 
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which the Morgan Stanley traders had a long position consisted largely of mezzanine ABS 
tranches of the kind they were short.  In the terminology of the world of corporate CDOs, 
that it made it a correlation trade, and had the position been shown to a correlation trader 
he or she would immediately have seen that the trade utterly depended on the correlation 
of those BBB tranches remaining at the modest levels reflected in the AAA rating.  If 
correlation was high, and if some BBB tranches defaulted (as the Morgan Stanley traders 
expected them to), then it was probable that many other such tranches would also default.  
If that happened, even the AAA super-senior tranche of an ABS CDO composed of these 
tranches would be likely to default in its turn.  Indeed, a corporate correlation trader, in a 
different section of the bank, would simply not have been allowed to take on such a 
gigantic exposure to correlation, as this position would have been understood, in that 
section, to involve. 
 
 The fact that the position was taken on indicates either belief that correlation was 
indeed low, or simply belief that a tranche rated AAA must be much more creditworthy 
than a BBB tranche.  (It is more likely that it was the latter, but my data do not allow me 
to be certain.)  Crucially, the detailed history of the trade reveals that such convictions 
were not restricted to the Morgan Stanley group.  Merrill Lynch turned down the latter’s 
offer to buy $2 billion of its super-senior ABS CDO tranches because the 28 basis point 
spread Morgan Stanley demanded was greater than the 24 basis points Merrill was 
prepared to pay (Lewis 2010, p. 208).  The difference, as Lewis points out, was a mere 
$800,000 a year, a sum Merrill’s traders would surely gladly have paid had they thought 
that there was any real risk of the tranches in question defaulting.  Similarly, even as the 
crisis began to unfold in July 2007, two other banks, UBS and Mizuho Financial Group, 
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purchased large chunks of Morgan Stanley’s super-senior ABS CDO positions from it at 
what appears to be reasonably close to face value. 
 
 Within a matter of days, such sales could no longer be made.  When Morgan 
Stanley finally extricated itself from some of the remainder of its super-senior 
position by selling it back to Deutsche, it received only 7 percent of its face value 
(Lewis 2010, p. 214).  In a single year, a $16 billion ABS CDO position that had been 
evaluated as AAA had apparently lost up to 93 percent of its value.60  Repeated across 
the portfolios of many of the world’s leading banks, falls of this kind helped push 
many of them close to, or beyond, the boundary of insolvency. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has shown how the clusters of evaluation practices surrounding ABS and 
CDOs differed, and how (via the “convention” formed by the ratings-spreads nexus and 
the organizational division of labor in ratings agencies) those practices fueled an arbitrage 
that had the disastrous consequences outlined in the previous section.  A number of 
questions nevertheless remain.  
 
One question is substantive: since corporate CDOs themselves embodied an 
arbitrage similar in its nature to the ABS CDO arbitrage, why did they not have similar 
disastrous effects?  The answer appears to be contingent.  The capacity to sell on 
“leveraged loans” (loans that were used mainly for “leveraged buyouts,” in other words 
debt-fueled takeovers) by packaging them into CDOs helped increase levels of leverage, 
                                                
60 I write “apparently” because, as indicated in the discussion of the ABX above, it remained the case 
that there was no fully definitive way of valuing positions of this kind. 
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and it did loosen lending standards in that sector too.  In particular, CDO funding was 
associated with less tight loan covenants (these covenants give rights to creditors and 
impose restrictions on borrowers).  However, the other correlates of the packaging of 
leveraged loans into CDOs – cheaper and more readily available credit – had the 
countervailing effect of making it possible to finance leveraged buyouts of much larger 
firms.  The fact that other things being equal such firms are safer – they “generated more 
free cash flows … and were less risky” (Shivdasani and Wang 2009, p. 5) – seems to have 
counterbalanced the effects of the tendency to looser covenants.61  As in other aspects of 
the account given here, specific contingencies (in this case, the presence in corporate 
lending of a countervailing effect absent in mortgage lending) matter greatly. 
 
 A more general issue, an analytical one, raised by my focus on evaluation practices 
concerns belief.  Should we understand the conduct of those practices and the use of their 
results as having been driven by belief in them, or should it be seen as cynical, as driven 
simply by the pursuit of gain (for example, by earning fees from ratings)?  More broadly, 
were those involved self-interested rational actors freely choosing their actions, or did 
those actions, at least sometimes, “incorporate institutional rules by taking them for 
granted without much decision or reflection” (Meyer 2009, p. 41)?  Did “habit” (Camic 
1986) or even “habitus” (e.g., Bourdieu 1984) play a role? 
 
 Of course, habits and social interests are interwoven: what is in our interest often 
becomes habitual (as, indeed, Bourdieu’s work reminds us).  Nevertheless, because of the 
                                                
61 See also Hu, Solomon, and May (2008), who show that loans packaged into CLOs (as CDOs whose 
pools are leveraged loans are called) suffered fewer downgrades on average than a control group of 
non-packaged loans. 
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understandable desire to assign blame it is easy in the aftermath of a calamity such as the 
credit crisis to adopt too simplistically what (Vaughan 1996, p.36) calls the “amoral 
calculator hypothesis.”  Certainly, reflexive, calculative action has played a major role in 
my narrative: what is arbitrage, after all, if it is not action of this kind, action that exploits 
discrepancies in others’ evaluations (see Beunza and Stark 2004)?62 Yet the episodes 
discussed here include at least one set of cases (the super-senior ABS CDO trades outlined 
at the end of the previous section) that are hard to interpret without invoking belief either 
in evaluation practices or in the ratings that were their products.  Nor, I think, would 
amoral calculation be a correct interpretation of the way the rating agencies evaluated 
ABS CDOs: I have found no clear evidence that they saw the danger of ABS CDOs, and 
ignored it for the sake of fees.  On the contrary, the evaluation of ABS CDOs using 
existing corporate CDO models and similar correlation values is plausibly interpretable as 
organizational routine: the extension to a new domain of evaluation practices that were 
familiar and convenient, and that did not involve the considerable development effort that 
analyzing ABS CDOs in the alternative ways I sketched in that section would have 
needed. 
 
 The analogy with Vaughan’s work also raises a second analytical issue: 
organizational structure.  There is a sense in which the account presented here contrasts 
quite sharply with Beunza and Stark’s (2004) discussion of arbitrage, despite our shared 
                                                
62 It would also, for example, be quite mistaken to imagine that all ratings were believed in.  Thus one 
of my rating-agencies interviewees reported a discussion with investors, prior to the crisis, about a type 
of market-value CDO (see note 28) called a CPDO, Constant Proportion Debt Obligation, which a 
different agency had rated AAA.  He told them that in his view a more appropriate rating would be 
BBB.  They agreed, but they still welcomed the AAA rating because of the lower regulatory capital-
reserve requirement the higher rating brought with it. 
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focus on differences between evaluation practices.  In their analysis, “the friction among 
competing principles of arbitrage” is productive: it “generates new ways of recognizing 
opportunities” (Stark 2009, p. 16).  While that is the case here too, it is so only 
temporarily: opportunities that are recognized are soon eclipsed by dangers that are not 
identified.  Instead of Stark’s “heterarchy” (flexible governance that makes friction 
productive by facilitating organizationally-distributed “reflexive cognition,” with for 
example elements of “self-management” and “lateral accountability” rather than simply 
“vertical authority”63), what I have found is more often reminiscent of the rigidities and 
barriers to information flow in the background of the Challenger disaster (Vaughan 1996).  
As noted in the introduction, the ABS CDO seems less the productively polysemic 
“boundary object” of the social studies of science (Star and Griesemer 1989) than a kind 
of epistemic orphan, cognitively peripheral to its parent worlds, and not the object of a 
new creole or even much of a pidgin (q.v. Galison 1997).64   
 
What is in retrospect striking is how little sense there was before the crisis of the 
dangers that were accumulating in ABS CDOs.  As noted in the introduction, the first 
interviews for the research reported here were conducted in 2006 and early 2007, before 
                                                
63 Stark (2009, pp. 5 and 113).  The notion of “heterarchy” is of course the inheritor of a long-standing 
strand of work in organizational sociology, stretching back at least to the “organic management” 
identified by Burns and Stalker (1961) as suitable for fast-changing environments. 
64 For example, while there were around a dozen textbooks of corporate CDO correlation modeling, 
and hundreds of publicly available technical reports and research papers stretching back at least to 
1996, there was no textbook of the equivalent practices in regard to ABS CDOs and I have been able to 
find only three publicly available research papers, all from the end of the period discussed here (2007-
8) and by the same two researchers from the Franco-Belgian Bank, Dexia (e.g. Garcia and Goosens 
2008). 
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the crisis, and they concerned the evaluation practices surrounding corporate CDOs.  The 
practitioners of these had their concerns – one rating-agency employee reported: “Some 
investors have said ... to us ... ‘does a AAA mean the same thing as it meant five years 
ago?’” – but to the extent that those concerns had a specific focus it was a sophisticated 
form of CDO called a CPDO (constant proportion debt obligation), not the vastly bigger 
volume of the “boring” ABS CDOs.  Similarly, the pre-crisis conference “trip reports” by 
Mark Adelson of Nomura (now publicly available: see e.g. Adelson 2006c,d and 2007a) 
reveal widespread awareness amongst ABS specialists of growing problems and high 
levels of fraud within the US mortgage market, but not the perception that the apparently 
safe ABS CDOs were exquisitely exposed to those problems. To recognize the dangers of 
ABS CDOs, one had to have an awareness both of the risks accumulating in ABSs and of 
the pivotal role of the assumption of only modest correlation amongst those ABSs in the 
evaluation of ABS CDOs, and it seems as if few did.  Certainly, those who were prepared 
on the very eve of the crisis to buy the super-senior tranches of those CDOs seem not to 
have had. 
 
 Again, the amoral calculator hypothesis is conceivable: that some of the almost 
complete pre-crisis silence on the dangers of ABS CDOs was a version of Bourdieu’s 
“complicitous silence,” the silence of those who could have spoken but did not do so.65  
Stark’s work, however, suggests an alternative conjecture: that it would have taken 
heterarchical organization to fuse together the two institutionally separate insights needed 
fully to grasp those dangers.  The conjecture is plausible: in particular, Goldman Sachs, 
reported by several of my interviewees to be more heterarchical in its organization than 
                                                
65 “The most successful ideological effects are the ones that have no need of words, but only of laissez-
faire and complicitous silence” (Bourdieu 1990, p. 133; see Tett 2009b). 
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most other major banks (it was a partnership, not a public company, until 1999), escaped 
financially almost unscathed.  Unlike almost all other banks, Goldman hedged or 
liquidated its ABS and ABS CDO positions several months before the crisis.  However, 
the systematic, comparative organizational research needed to test the conjecture is, for 
reasons of access, currently impossible. 
 
 This is only one of the ways in which the account given here does not claim to be 
comprehensive.  I have emphasized that my aim is to complement other explanations of 
the crisis, not to replace them, and the account I have given clearly needs integrated with 
broader analyses, for example of the causes of the generalized increase in risk-taking in 
banking in the run-up to the crisis.  (Although I’ve emphasized the crucial role of ABS 
CDOs in the crisis, some banks – such as Lehman and the UK’s HBOS – rendered 
themselves insolvent or close to it mainly by old-fashioned reckless lending, particularly 
in commercial property.)  Nor has my account exhausted the sociological interest of credit 
derivatives, which are for example a rich topic for Muniesa’s (2007) “pragmatics of 
prices.”66  There are also at least two further ways in which other forms of the economic 
sociology of evaluation could be applied in this area.  First, it has been crucial to the 
                                                
66 Restrictions on the dissemination of the prices of credit derivatives – even those traded in what are in 
other respects canonical-mechanism markets – mean that there is often no unique set of market prices.  
Dealers can, and do, quote different prices – narrower or broader spreads between the prices at which 
they will buy and sell protection – to different categories of market participant.  Again, materiality 
matters, in this case via the technical possibility of capturing the email messages containing dealers’ 
price quotations and extracting and then circulating the prices they contain, a possibility which some 
dealers have attempted to block by making their emails non-forwardable.  CMA, a firm specializing in 
extracting prices in this way, has circumvented this by  developing a system that in effect electronically 
“scans” these non-forwardable emails. 
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development of the credit default swap market that these swaps are not classed as 
insurance, because if they were the buyer of protection would have to own the asset in 
question or have some other “insurable interest” in it, and the seller would be governed by 
the regulatory framework surrounding insurance.  The contested legitimacy of contracts 
that resemble insurance but do not have these features largely remains to be studied 
(though it is touched on by Huault and Rainelli-Le Montagner 2009, pp. 559-60). 
 
 Second, in my interviews there is an intriguing hint of the presence of an “order of 
worth” (Bolanski and Thévenot 2006; Stark 2009) quite different from monetary 
calculation.  One interviewee told me how, as mortgage defaults mounted, traders in his 
bank started to exclaim “No respect for the obligation!”  I confess that I was so unused to 
hearing moralism of this sort from City of London or Wall Street traders that I asked him 
whether they were being ironic, and was told they were not: they were genuinely affronted 
by what they took to be violations of moral obligation.  In other contexts it would be 
regarded as positively irrational if the owner of an asset who enjoys limited liability (as, de 
facto, American residential-mortgage borrowers generally do) does not default when the 
asset’s market value falls far below the sum of debt that funds it.67  This may be an 
indication that – even amongst Wall Street traders – personal debts, especially home 
mortgages, with all their entanglement in the world of domesticity,68 implicitly enjoyed a 
                                                
67 The postulate that a firm’s shareholders will allow it to default when this happens is the foundation 
of the “Merton model” (see note 32) that informed the development of the Gaussian copula.  Only in 
certain states, such as California, are home mortgages legally no-recourse loans, but in practice US 
mortgage lenders seem not to pursue defaulters’ other assets, even when legally they can, because the 
costs of doing so tend to be larger than the sums recovered. 
68 See Boltanski and Thévenot (2006, pp. 164-78), though what they mean is broader than the ordinary 
meaning of the domestic. 
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special status, perhaps even that this special status in some way underpinned the pervasive 
sense that mortgage-backed securities were uniquely safe.  That, though, is speculation, 
and certainly cannot be tested with the data I have. 
 
I hope that in its focus on evaluation practices at the heart of the credit crisis, 
the article has thrown some light on it, and has also shown that attention to these 
practices is of interest to economic sociology more generally.  If nothing else, the 
crisis has shown how dangerous it can be (for example to public policy) to assess 
market processes in abstraction from the cognitive and organizational reality of 
evaluation practices.  In April 2006, the IMF noted: 
There is growing recognition that the dispersion of credit risk by 
banks to a broader and more diverse group of investors, rather than 
warehousing such risks on their balance sheets, has helped to make 
the banking and overall financial system more resilient.  (IMF 2006, 
p. 51)69 
As we now know, quite the opposite was in fact happening.  Driven in part by the 
evaluation practices and organizational processes discussed here, risk was being 
accumulated, not dispersed, and the financial system was growing more fragile, not more 
resilient.  There can surely be no more vivid demonstration of the need for a broadening 
of the disciplinary basis of research on financial markets, and in that broadening 
economic sociology has a vital role to play. 
                                                
69 In fairness to the IMF, I should acknowledge that it did point out that while “pricing data are 
relatively easy to obtain ... measuring the degree and effectiveness of risk transfer continues to present 
statistical and methodological challenges” (IMF 2006, p. 78) 
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 Figure 2: An ABS or CDO (simplified and not to scale) 
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Investors in lower tranches receive payments only if funds remain after payments due to investors in more 
senior tranches are made.  In an ABS the assets in the pool are typically mortgages or other consumer debt.  
In a corporate CDO they are loans made to corporations or bonds issued by them.  What is shown is a “cash 
CDO”: in a “synthetic CDO” the special purpose vehicle “sells protection” on the assets via credit default 
swaps (see the third section of the article) rather than buying them. 
  Special purpose vehicle: uses money from investors 
to buy pool of debt (e.g. 
mortgages, corporate 
loans, bonds, or other 
assets) and uses cash-flow 
from it to make payments 
to investors. 
 
mezzanine tranche or 
tranches 
Senior tranche or 
tranches (in CDOs 
often divided in two 
with super-senior 
tranche above senior) 
asset 2 
asset 1 
asset n 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.  
“first-loss piece” (ABS) or 
equity tranche (CDO) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: schematic structure of a typical subprime mortgage-backed security. 
Source: based on Lucas (2007).  Note that the overall size of the tranches is not shown to 
scale.  The lowest tranche was often replaced by over-collateralization (see note 27 for 
the meaning of this and of “excess spread”), but if first-loss securities were issued they 
were generally either unrated or rated BB. 
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Figure 4  Packaging tranches of subprime  
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 2 
mortgage-backed securities into ABS CDOs. 
Source: modified from Lucas (2007).   
Tranche sizes not shown to scale.   
“NR” means “not rated.” 
 3 
 
 CDO Evaluator 
three-year default 
probability 
assumptions, as of 
June 2006 (percent) 
Realized incidence 
of default, as of 
July 2009 (percent) 
AAA 0.008 0.10 
AA+ 0.014 1.68 
AA 0.042 8.16 
AA- 0.053 12.03 
A+ 0.061 20.96 
A 0.088 29.21 
A- 0.118 36.65 
BBB+ 0.340 48.73 
BBB 0.488 56.10 
BBB- 0.881 66.67 
 
Table 1  CDO Evaluator’s three-year default probability assumptions versus realized 
default rate of US subprime mortgage-backed securities issued from 2005 to 2007. 
 
Sources: Adelson (2006a); Erturk and Gillis (2009). 
 
